From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!bonnie.concordia.ca!thunder.mcrcim.mcgill.edu!snorkelwacker.mit.edu!spool.mu.edu!caen!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!wupost!darwin.sura.net!gatech!ncar!hsdn Fri Jan 31 10:26:43 EST 1992
Article 3236 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!bonnie.concordia.ca!thunder.mcrcim.mcgill.edu!snorkelwacker.mit.edu!spool.mu.edu!caen!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!wupost!darwin.sura.net!gatech!ncar!hsdn
dev!husc-news.harvard.edu!zariski!zeleny
>From: zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Intelligence Testing
Message-ID: <1992Jan28.221850.8195@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: 29 Jan 92 03:18:46 GMT
References: <1992Jan27.201926.20498@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca> 
 <1992Jan27.191241.8139@husc3.harvard.edu> <1992Jan28.183603.21220@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca>
Organization: Dept. of Math, Harvard Univ.
Lines: 172
Nntp-Posting-Host: zariski.harvard.edu

In article <1992Jan28.183603.21220@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca> 
pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:

>In article <1992Jan27.191241.8139@husc3.harvard.edu> 
>zeleny@brauer.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

>>In article <1992Jan27.201926.20498@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca> 
>>pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:

MZ:
>>Introspection fails in exactly the same ways as perception.  People have

AP:                                
>No, not exactly the same (militant ignorance?)

One can refuse to see, feel, etc., in the same way one can refuse to
understand; an extreme example is anaesthesia caused by autosuggestion.

MZ:
>>been conducting and discussing thought experiments as long as they have
>>been conducting empirical observations.  Moreover, the thesis that only
>>empirical facts can be known is not itself amenable to empirical
>>confirmation.  In other words, your anti-philosophical stance is sheer
>>religious prejudice, a form of militant ignorance.

AP:
>You are barking up a wrong tree. I have no objection to thought experiments, 
>but I'd like to point out that they are modellings of _external world_ 

Not at all.  Some question the very idea of an external world; see the
Second Meditation of Descartes.

AP:
>                                                                        and
>are communicable to others (you seem to agree that they are communicable).

Quite so, but only in the sense that I can suggest to you a way of
contemplating the issue in a way similar to my approach thereof.
Naturally, your conclusions may vary.

AP:
>What I objected to in David Gudeman's praise of
>introspection was a notion that these incomnunicable fruits of introspection
>(like self-awareness of understanding, etc) have any validity outside a person
>experiencing them. 

This is only a testimony to your ignorance of the subject you presume to
discuss with remarkable self-assurance.  Regardless of your opinion
thereof, the Cartesian "cogito" is rightly considered to be valid for all
beings possessed of a reflective capacity, provided that it is valid for
any of them.  You really should take an introductory course in philosophy
before you emit any more nonsensical assertions of the above sort.

AP:
>                  I did not claim that only empirical facts can be known (this
>would require deciding first in which sense do we use word 'known'), I only
>claimed that only empirical facts (I include here their interpretation, i.e.
>post-experimental mental processing), as having a chance of being agreed upon,

You seem to overestimate the value of consensus.  A cursory reading in the
history of science or, for that matter, political history, would
unfailingly disabuse you of your fallacious notions.  For example, look
into the reception of Einstein's theories, including his interpretation of
quantum mechanics.

AP:
>as opposed to incommunicable, subjective _feelings_, are worth talkin about.

This is your value judgment, and you are welcome to it.  However,
philosophy doesn't work that way.  If I were a poet who felt that only
subjective feelings are worth talking about, I wouldn't presume to try
forcing any physicists to behave in accordance with my personal views.  
Why is it more right for you to demand adherence to an engineering
methodology of people who gather to discuss philosophical issues?

AP:
>Perhaps you should read more carefully the postings you are criticizing.
>Your last sentence above 
>does not seem to contribute anything to the issues discussed, does it?
>I wonder if putting down your opponents using name-calling makes you feel
>better about yourself, does it?

Perhaps you should think more carefully about the implications of what you
are saying with so much vigor.  As a student of philosophy, I only ask of
the world to allow me to do my work in the way it's been done for the past
two and a half millenia; you, on the other hand, tell me that I can't do
so, without ever bothering to learn anything about what it is that I do.

I don't march in your toilet; don't piss on my parade.

AP:
>>>Hence you claim that the conclusions from your introspection are more certain
>>>that those reached by consensus with other people? Isn't this called
>>>solipsism?

MZ:
>>No, it isn't. Even a die-hard empiricist would agree with this view.  
>>If you want to use technical terminology, use it correctly.

AP:
>>>Not true. Mathematics has an attribute of being communicable to other people
>>>(at least some :-)) in a way that leads to a consensus. 

MZ:
>>This is demonstrably false.  I refer you to sci.math for an example of the

AP:
>Why don't you demonstrate it?

I gave an example; do your homework and look it up.

MZ:
>>same sort of controversy as is liable to arise in the philosophical
>>community (AC vs.  AD).

AP:
>>>This seems to imply to me that according to you consciousness is possible 
>>>(by your definition) only in beings that _are like us_, unless proven otherwise.
>>>It also seems that you cannot imagine how this could ever be proven and even
>>>tend to think it is impossible in principle.
>>>To me it sounds like: 'I am convinced that humans have souls until you prove
>>>otherwise. In fact it might be impossible in principle to disprove existence
>>>of a soul'
>>>I prefer a different approach: Unless you prove that humans have souls
>>>I see no reason to believe that there exists such a thing and see no merit 
>>>in discussing consciousness as something which _in principle_ cannot be 
>>>determined from outside, independent of our beliefs who or what can be
>>>conscious. 

MZ
>>I'll let David judge that, and limit myself to saying that you might find
>>it useful to get a clue about the methods and terms of philosophy before
>>repeating the same elementary mistakes in knocking introspection.  In
>>particular, you might consider Locke's view that all our knowledge comes
>>from experience and introspection.  You simply can't get any more
>>empiricist than that; yet any number of fools still keep on trying.

AP:
>I like to talk to people who know more than I do, so I can learn new things,
>modify my (false) views etc. This is even the case if they are arrogant 
>people who think that they have a monopoly on wisdom. However, if they are 
>arrogant fools, who only open their mouth to attempt to demonstrate their own
>superiority and the content of their contributions does not go beyond what can
>be generated by _simple_ syntactical manipulations, then interacting with them
>is a waste of time. Such people abound.

I neither know, nor care to know whether I am "superior" to anybody.
However, I know that I am certainly no one's inferior.  You are the one
telling me to do my work in accordance with your ill-considered (because
philosophically discredited) rules.  If you want to learn, you should be
prepared to stand corrected in accordance with the rules accepted within
the discipline in question.  If you just want to rant and rave, feel free
to have the last word.

>-- 
>Andrzej Pindor
>University of Toronto
>Computing Services
>pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca


`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'
: Qu'est-ce qui est bien?  Qu'est-ce qui est laid?         Harvard   :
: Qu'est-ce qui est grand, fort, faible...                 doesn't   :
: Connais pas! Connais pas!                                 think    :
:                                                             so     :
: Mikhail Zeleny                                                     :
: 872 Massachusetts Ave., Apt. 707                                   :
: Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139           (617) 661-8151            :
: email zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu or zeleny@HUMA1.BITNET            :
:                                                                    :
'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`


