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Article 3234 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: rc@depsych.Gwinnett.COM (Richard Carlson)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Intelligence Testing
Message-ID: <es90eB2w164w@depsych.Gwinnett.COM>
Date: 28 Jan 92 23:08:13 GMT
References: <385@tdatirv.UUCP>
Lines: 63

sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) writes:

> In article <11906@optima.cs.arizona.edu> gudeman@cs.arizona.edu (David Gudema
> |In article  <1992Jan23.215711.6793@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca> Andrzej Pindor writ
> |]On some other occasion I've tried to coax people to spell more clearly what
> |]meant by 'semantical processing', but there were no takers.
> |
> |Semantical processing of a sentence about X involves thinking about X,
> |not about the sentence.  Syntactical processing of a sentence about X
> |involves only the sentence and not X.  However, if you didn't know
> |that already without me saying it, then you almost certainly do not
> |have the background to understand it (I know I didn't when I took my
> |first course in pragmatics.)
> 
> O.K., so what does it mean to be 'thinking about X'? 
> And how does it differ than considering a set of prior 'sentences'
> involving the term X?  (Including the internal encoding of prior direct
> experience with X as being equivalent to sentences about X)

It is most likely some melange of "text" (semantic elements),
graphics (imagery) and behavioral intentions ("attitudes").

> [Prior experience *must* be encoded in some way, since the experience itself
> is no longer available, and much evidence suggests that all memories are
> *reconstructions* not direct recall, and prior experience can generally be
> expressed as real sentences].

A lot of forensic research done on the use of hypnosis and other
techniques to help eye witnesses recall details indeed suggests
that memories are reconstructions (not complete recordings as
Freud, among others, speculated) but the focus on verbal encoding
into sentences hasn't emerged from the research.  (You can alter a
person's recall with verbal suggestions.  Any competent hypnotist
can convince a witness he did or did not see something.)

> |]... All this talk about self-awareness, feelings, pain etc. etc.
> |]is a waste of time till we have _objective_ ways of detecting them.
> |
> |It is the pro-AIers who are causing this waste of time by claiming
> |that the external appearence of internal experiences _is_ an objective
> |way of detecting them.
> 
> It is the best we have available currently.  Until a better method is develop
> we are stuck with it.
> 
> Of course, as someone else suggested it is likely that in the process of
> creating a system which passes the current set of tests we will achieve a
> much better concept of what it means to 'understand' something.  Then we
> will have a different, better test (at least if it can be applied to humans
> as a way of calibrating it, and making sure it captures the appropriate
> scope of performance).

I was one of the persons who suggested that.  And the Turing test
does serve that purpose.  I now think it would be even more useful
if we added the Houdini test and assumed until proved otherwise
that if a computer appeared to be conscious and conversing with us
we should look for the trick the programmer is using.

--
Richard Carlson        |    rc@depsych.gwinnett.COM
Midtown Medical Center |    {rutgers,ogicse,gatech}!emory!gwinnett!depsych!rc
Atlanta, Georgia       |
(404) 881-6877         |


