From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!pindor Fri Jan 31 10:26:36 EST 1992
Article 3224 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!pindor
>From: pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: Intelligence Testing
Message-ID: <1992Jan28.183603.21220@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca>
Organization: UTCS Public Access
References: <11927@optima.cs.arizona.edu> <1992Jan27.201926.20498@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca> <1992Jan27.191241.8139@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 1992 18:36:03 GMT

In article <1992Jan27.191241.8139@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@brauer.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
>In article <1992Jan27.201926.20498@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca> 
>pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:
>
>Introspection fails in exactly the same ways as perception.  People have
                                  
No, not exactly the same (militant ignorance?)

>been conducting and discussing thought experiments as long as they have
>been conducting empirical observations.  Moreover, the thesis that only
>empirical facts can be known is not itself amenable to empirical
>confirmation.  In other words, your anti-philosophical stance is sheer
>religious prejudice, a form of militant ignorance.
>
You are barking up a wrong tree. I have no objection to thought experiments, 
but I'd like to point out that they are modellings of _external world_ and
are communicable to others (you seem to agree that they are communicable).
What I objected to in David Gudeman's praise of
introspection was a notion that these incomnunicable fruits of introspection
(like self-awareness of understanding, etc) have any validity outside a person
experiencing them. I did not claim that only empirical facts can be known (this
would require deciding first in which sense do we use word 'known'), I only
claimed that only empirical facts (I include here their interpretation, i.e.
post-experimental mental processing), as having a chance of being agreed upon, 
as opposed to incommunicable, subjective _feelings_, are worth talkin about.
Perhaps you should read more carefully the postings you are criticizing.
Your last sentence above 
does not seem to contribute anything to the issues discussed, does it?
I wonder if putting down your opponents using name-calling makes you feel
better about yourself, does it?
>
>AP:
>>Hence you claim that the conclusions from your introspection are more certain
>>that those reached by consensus with other people? Isn't this called
>>solipsism?
>
>No, it isn't. Even a die-hard empiricist would agree with this view.  
>If you want to use technical terminology, use it correctly.
>
>AP:
>>Not true. Mathematics has an attribute of being communicable to other people
>>(at least some :-)) in a way that leads to a consensus. 
>
>This is demonstrably false.  I refer you to sci.math for an example of the

Why don't you demonstrate it?

>same sort of controversy as is liable to arise in the philosophical
>community (AC vs.  AD).
>
>AP:
>>This seems to imply to me that according to you consciousness is possible 
>>(by your definition) only in beings that _are like us_, unless proven otherwise.
>>It also seems that you cannot imagine how this could ever be proven and even
>>tend to think it is impossible in principle.
>>To me it sounds like: 'I am convinced that humans have souls until you prove
>>otherwise. In fact it might be impossible in principle to disprove existence
>>of a soul'
>>I prefer a different approach: Unless you prove that humans have souls
>>I see no reason to believe that there exists such a thing and see no merit 
>>in discussing consciousness as something which _in principle_ cannot be 
>>determined from outside, independent of our beliefs who or what can be
>>conscious. 
>
>I'll let David judge that, and limit myself to saying that you might find
>it useful to get a clue about the methods and terms of philosophy before
>repeating the same elementary mistakes in knocking introspection.  In
>particular, you might consider Locke's view that all our knowledge comes
>from experience and introspection.  You simply can't get any more
>empiricist than that; yet any number of fools still keep on trying.
>
>
>>-- 
>>Andrzej Pindor
>>University of Toronto
>>Computing Services
>>pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca
>
>
>`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'
>: Qu'est-ce qui est bien?  Qu'est-ce qui est laid?         Harvard   :
>: Qu'est-ce qui est grand, fort, faible...                 doesn't   :
>: Connais pas! Connais pas!                                 think    :
>:                                                             so     :
>: Mikhail Zeleny                                                     :
>: 872 Massachusetts Ave., Apt. 707                                   :
>: Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139           (617) 661-8151            :
>: email zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu or zeleny@HUMA1.BITNET            :
>:                                                                    :
>'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`

I like to talk to people who know more than I do, so I can learn new things,
modify my (false) views etc. This is even the case if they are arrogant 
people who think that they have a monopoly on wisdom. However, if they are 
arrogant fools, who only open their mouth to attempt to demonstrate their own
superiority and the content of their contributions does not go beyond what can
be generated by _simple_ syntactical manipulations, then interacting with them
is a waste of time. Such people abound.
-- 
Andrzej Pindor
University of Toronto
Computing Services
pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca


