From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Fri Jan 31 10:26:32 EST 1992
Article 3218 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and Panpsychism
Message-ID: <1992Jan28.164410.9509@psych.toronto.edu>
Keywords: panpsychism
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Jan27.155128.5910@oracorp.com> <1992Jan28.004208.27238@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Jan28.153645.5237@cs.yale.edu>
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 1992 16:44:10 GMT

In article <1992Jan28.153645.5237@cs.yale.edu> mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott) writes:
>I would like to plead for more standard use of terms in this argument
>over "panpsychism."  As far as I can see, McCullough's position would
>be better labeled as a species of behaviorism, the idea that there is
>no real fact of the matter whether a system is conscious or not.  A
>judgement whether something is conscious is a matter of esthetics or
>whimsy.
>
>Panpsychism is the position that every bit of matter has some sort of
>primordial consciousness, and the brain simply concentrates it.
>Brains are able to do this, and bricks are not, for reasons we don't
>yet understand.

Well, as the originator of the term's use here, I would like to defend it.
I will agree that my usage of the word may be nonstandard, but I prefer it
over the term "behaviourism" because that word has been bandied about here
so much so as to lose all meaning.  Also, the term panpsychism carries an
important connotation, namely, that it is not just *computers* which could
be conscious, but *any* bit of appropriately arranged matter.  Indeed, looked
upon this way, I'm not so sure that the usage here is that far off from what
you give as the definition above!

>Note: panpsychism is exactly the opposite of McCullough's position,
>because it is ultrarealist on the subject of consciousness, whereas
>McCullough seems to think consciousness is just tomfoolery.

When people say "I *think* consciousness is just tomfoolery" I begin to
wonder if they aren't simply being slying ironic.  Either that or completely
confused about the meaning of terms.  Minsky is reputed to have said
"I don't believe in belief." (I suppose, since he posts here, he can confirm
whether this is true.)  Such statements I find completely incoherent.


>Panpsychism is attractive to AI people who are (a) realist about the
>mind, (b) think the mind is unobservable, or directly observable only to
>itself; (c) believe computation will account for everything
>observable and nothing else.  They're left needing some way for the
>mind to ride along on the computation, and panpsychism is one way.  I
>think David Chalmers might defend this view.  McCullough is not a
>panpsychist because he denies (a).  For what it's worth, I am not a
>panpsychist because I accept (a) and (c) but not (b).

Your presentation is certainly one way of viewing things, a way which had not
occurred to me.  But I would doubt that you would find very many, if any
AI-ers who claim to be panpsychists under your definition, primarily because
I think that anyone who accepts (a) and (b) would deny (c).  But then again,
I may be wrong.

- michael
 



