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Article 3203 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: gudeman@cs.arizona.edu (David Gudeman)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Intelligence Testing
Message-ID: <11975@optima.cs.arizona.edu>
Date: 28 Jan 92 07:01:36 GMT
Sender: news@cs.arizona.edu
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In article  <42277@dime.cs.umass.edu> Joseph O'Rourke writes:
]
]I would prefer to approach understanding as if it were a black-box
]property of a subject, independent of the mechanism for answering
]the questions.  After all, part of the point of this exercise is
]to question whether the mechanisms are fundamentally different.
]I want to approach undertanding as a scientist would approach an unknown 
]phenomenon.  I want to see if the results "seem" like understanding, and 
]for this I do not need to assume that the mechanism for answering is
]understanding.  Indeed, it is counter to the point of the questions
]in the first place.

Fine.  Then pick a word that means "seems like understanding" and the
argument is resolved.
--
					David Gudeman
gudeman@cs.arizona.edu
noao!arizona!gudeman


