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Article 3188 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: zeleny@brauer.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Intelligence Testing
Message-ID: <1992Jan27.191241.8139@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: 28 Jan 92 00:12:37 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Jan27.191241.8139
References: <11927@optima.cs.arizona.edu> <1992Jan27.201926.20498@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca>
Organization: Dept. of Math, Harvard Univ.
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In article <1992Jan27.201926.20498@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca> 
pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:

>In article <11927@optima.cs.arizona.edu> 
>gudeman@cs.arizona.edu (David Gudeman) writes:

>>In article  <1992Jan26.220013.7722@mp.cs.niu.edu> 
>>Neil Rickert writes:

NR:
>>] The problem, however, is that yours is a completely unscientific approach.
>>]Using introspection means observing yourself.  This means you are subject
>>]to total bias.  Scientific investigation must avoid bias.

DG:
>>If introspection is total bias, then so is reading an instrument.  In
>>either case the observation is a personal one, and someone else can
>>deny that you are correct, even though you are certain that you are
>>correct.  Furthermore, the conclusion that _I_ am conscious is even
>>more certain than any conclusion I can get from my senses.  My senses
>>can be fooled, but I cannot be fooled into thinking I am conscious
>>unless I _am_ conscious.  The conclusion that I am conscious follows
>>logically from the premise that I think about whether I am conscious
>>or not.

AP:
>Several people can read the same instrument and decide whether they agree what
>it says. Then they accept what they agree on. That's how science is done.
>But no one except you can introspect on your 'understanding' (or whatever). 
>Hence it is not science. Haven't you found out that your introspection tells
>you sometimes contradictory things (am I happy or not? am I conscious or am I
>dreaming?) In case of reading an instrument you can compare your experience
>with that of others, in case of feeling that you understand, you can't. The 
>first is science, the second is not.

Introspection fails in exactly the same ways as perception.  People have
been conducting and discussing thought experiments as long as they have
been conducting empirical observations.  Moreover, the thesis that only
empirical facts can be known is not itself amenable to empirical
confirmation.  In other words, your anti-philosophical stance is sheer
religious prejudice, a form of militant ignorance.

DG:
>>It is not possible for "science" to prove any fact with more certainty
>>than that.  And it is not possible for _empirical_ sciences to even
>>approach that level of certainty.  

AP:
>Hence you claim that the conclusions from your introspection are more certain
>that those reached by consensus with other people? Isn't this called
>solipsism?

No, it isn't. Even a die-hard empiricist would agree with this view.  
If you want to use technical terminology, use it correctly.

DG:
>Furthermore, all of mathematics is
>>based on the same sort of introspection by which I determine the fact
>>of my own consciousness.  Is mathematics not objective?

AP:
>Not true. Mathematics has an attribute of being communicable to other people
>(at least some :-)) in a way that leads to a consensus. 

This is demonstrably false.  I refer you to sci.math for an example of the
same sort of controversy as is liable to arise in the philosophical
community (AC vs.  AD).

NR:
>>] You have two choices.  You can come up with a method of determining
>>]consciousness which is free of bias, or you can declare consciousness as
>>]an area where science is not applicable.

DG:
>>No, I have a third choice.  I can simply observe that there is no
>>known method of determining consciousness _in others_ which is free of
>>_believing that they are like you_, and reserve my opinion on whether
>>such a thing might ever be possible.  This, coincidentally, is the
>>choice I take.

AP:
>This seems to imply to me that according to you consciousness is possible 
>(by your definition) only in beings that _are like us_, unless proven otherwise.
>It also seems that you cannot imagine how this could ever be proven and even
>tend to think it is impossible in principle.
>To me it sounds like: 'I am convinced that humans have souls until you prove
>otherwise. In fact it might be impossible in principle to disprove existence
>of a soul'
>I prefer a different approach: Unless you prove that humans have souls
>I see no reason to believe that there exists such a thing and see no merit 
>in discussing consciousness as something which _in principle_ cannot be 
>determined from outside, independent of our beliefs who or what can be
>conscious. 

I'll let David judge that, and limit myself to saying that you might find
it useful to get a clue about the methods and terms of philosophy before
repeating the same elementary mistakes in knocking introspection.  In
particular, you might consider Locke's view that all our knowledge comes
from experience and introspection.  You simply can't get any more
empiricist than that; yet any number of fools still keep on trying.

>>--
>>					David Gudeman
>>gudeman@cs.arizona.edu
>>noao!arizona!gudeman

>-- 
>Andrzej Pindor
>University of Toronto
>Computing Services
>pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca


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