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Article 3165 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: cash@convex.com (Peter Cash)
Subject: Re: red light / blue light scenario
Message-ID: <1992Jan26.223233.28580@convex.com>
Summary: It all depends on the story you tell...
Keywords: problem of personal identity
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Organization: The Instrumentality
References: <1992Jan23.194357.8713@smsc.sony.com> <1992Jan24.022109.23048@convex.com> <1992Jan26.004726.24463@smsc.sony.com>
Date: Sun, 26 Jan 1992 22:32:33 GMT
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In article <1992Jan26.004726.24463@smsc.sony.com> markc@smsc.sony.com (Mark Corscadden) writes:
>In article <1992Jan24.022109.23048@convex.com> cash@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes:
...
>  choice 1
>  Tomorrow, a duplicate of you will be created and awarded the medal.
>  The original won't get anything.

>  choice 2
>  No duplicate will be created tomorrow.  There will be a random lottery,
>  and you will have one chance in ten of getting the medal.

>At this point, if you have a workable "motivational tool", the question
>"what choice will you make?" is a perfectly clear one, free from semantic
>ambiguities and question-begging.  So what is your answer?

Hmmm. A suitable "motivational tool" for me would be $100 million dollars
in a Swiss bank. That's enough money so I can quit my job and live the life
of a wealthy philosopher. OK, so you're saying that I have a choice: a 1 in
10 chance in a drawing to win the 100 megabucks tomorrow (with no fiddling
about in your duplication laboratory), or I get to be duplicated and you
give it all to my "twin"? Who you jivin' man? You think I got rocks in my
head? I'll enter the drawing!

>Now for the promised explicit description of the motivation behind this
>game, with my apologies to those who feel that the motives are already
>transparent.  

>This is a simple game intended to reveal which of two simple
>alternatives you believe in.  You may well find both belief systems
>described below to be too simplistic for your tastes.  You may also find
>that the following descriptions are laden with the usual accurst semantic
>problems which will make their meanings quite questionable, but I don't
>know how to avoid that.

A "semantic problem" is a sign that the speaker may not understand what
he's saying. (Since you're trying to talk about something _very_
confusing--philosophical, even--this is in no way a slur on you. I get just
as confused when I'm talking about this stuff.) It is a caution sign that
maybe we are asking questions that we don't understand.

>  belief system A
>  You feel that your personal experience is tied to your current
>  physical self.  Thus, choice 1 offers you no hope to feel for
>  yourself, tomorrow, what it's like to win that medal; although it
>  would allow your to-be-created duplicate to have that experience.
>  A player who believes this way and is playing within the spirit
>  of the game will make choice 2, to maximize their own chance of
>  winning the medal tomorrow, at the expense of their duplicate.

First of all, I don't have any notion of what my "personal experience is
tied to". I have long since given up having notions like that. I know what
you mean when you say I get to enter the lottery, or that tomorrow my
"twin" gets the money; I don't follow what philosophical implications you
think this has.

>  belief system B
>  You feel that it's possible for your personal linear sequence of life
>  experiences, what you feel within you, to start in the original and end
>  in the duplicate.  It's a toss-up whether you will *be* the duplicate
>  or the original in the end, in every sense that's relevant to what
>  you will feel internally.  Thus, you make choice 1 in order to have
>  a 50/50 chance, tomorrow, of feeling what it's like to win the medal.

I find this very puzzling. Why do you think it might be the case that I
might "start in the original and end in the duplicate"? What are you
thinking here? 

In the story _as you have told it_, this is not possible. The original and
duplicate each _know_ who they are. The original wakes up under the blue
light, and the dupe wakes up under the red light (well, he _does_ take some
time to get used to the idea.) Is it possible that you are not telling me
the whole story? Have you _lied_ to me?

Maybe the _real_ story goes like this:

After the experimenter has told the fellow under the blue light that he is
the dupe, and he has sunk into slack-jawed horror, the experimenter emits a
high-pitched cackle. "Just kidding! Ha! Ha! Just kidding!" he wheezes.
"Actually, I switched the bulbs." He points at the subject under the red
light, "He's the duplicate! He's the one! Ah-hah hah hah ha!"

By now, both experimental subjects are sitting up rigidly, with jaws slack.
To both of them comes the same realization: neither of them knows who the
duplicate is! Maybe this joker's telling the truth now, and maybe he isn't.
As one, both rise up and beat the life out of this madly cackling
experimenter. Too late, they realize that now, they'll _never_ know: each
of them is doomed to go through life with the memories of P.C., but the
real P.C. can never be sure that he isn't the duplicate. 

So the two shrug and grin at each other. They know that the lawyers have
their orders, the foundation has been set up, and one of them gets the 100
megabucks. (The death of the experimenter will be blamed on a regrettable
power surge.) "So, what shall it be, 'paper rock and scissors', or just
flip a coin? one of them says."

Now, given this end to the story, I once again have a 50/50 chance of
winning, so of course, I'd play if I knew what will happen. But what has
this got to do with my ideas of "personal identity"?

>Again, the descriptions of alternatives A and B above are fraught
>with the very semantic problems which made the original scenario so
>unacceptable.  The whole idea of offering the two choices was to thrust
>the entire problem, semantics and all, back onto the reader.  So if
>the alternatives A and B read like nonsense to you, trash them.  But
>please try to make a choice (1 or 2) and explain why you made it.

Did I do this satisfactorily?
...
>If I understand this right, Peter would make choice 2 and take the one
>in ten chance of winning, since choice 1 allows only the duplicate to
>win.  Yes?  By the way, this is the opposite of what I believe.  I would
>go for choice 1 and expect to have, going in, a 50/50 chance of coming
>out as the duplicate and experiencing whatever the duplicate experiences.

In the original version of the red/blue story, yes--you're right. But not
for the reasons you think; my choice has nothing to do with philosophical
ideas of what makes a person "really me"--it has everything to do with the
story you're telling. 
--
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
             |      Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist.     |
Peter Cash   |       (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein)      |cash@convex.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


