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Article 3099 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: cash@convex.com (Peter Cash)
Subject: Re: red light / blue light scenario: a better forum?
Message-ID: <1992Jan24.022109.23048@convex.com>
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Date: Fri, 24 Jan 1992 02:21:09 GMT
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In article <1992Jan23.194357.8713@smsc.sony.com> markc@smsc.sony.com (Mark Corscadden) writes:
>Just over a month ago I posted the following scenario concerning subjective
>identity.  Sadly (from my point of view), almost no one replied.  If anyone
>would be kind enough to send me email suggesting a better forum for this
>kind of question than (comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech) I'd be very
>grateful.

Well, if a philosophy newsgroup isn't a good forum for discussing the
problem of identity, then I don't know what is. And this is indeed a very
nice variant of this much-discussed philosophical conundrum.

>  |   Red Light / Blue Light Scenario
>  | 
>  |   You lie down on a bed which has a blue light on the ceiling directly
>  |   above you.  Take a good look at the blue light above, and then close
>  |   your eyes and relax.  Next to you is an identical bed, but this one
>  |   has a red light on the ceiling above it.  At this instant a perfect
>  |   physical duplicate of you is created instantaneously and placed on the
>  |   bed next to you.  You are not physically effected in any way whatsoever.
>  | 
>  |   The light above you was blue when you closed your eyes.  Do you think
>  |   it's possible that you will see a red light when you open your eyes
>  |   again?  This is speaking from a purely subjective point of view; what
>  |   would it be like to *experience* this scenario?

Let's take a look at what you've said above. After a bit of thinking, it
occurred to me that one possible source of confusion in your story is your
equivocation over the word "you". That is, if I foolishly agree to subject
myself to your experiment and lie down under the apparatus below the blue
light, then do _I_ open my eyes and look up at the red light? When you say,
"The light above you was blue when you closed your eyes", then you are
begging the question at issue.

Suppose that individual X opens his eyes and sees a red light bulb. He
remembers agreeing to the experiment, and lying down under the blue
light...or does he? 

The experimenter looks down at X, and says, "See, the other guy over
there"-- he points at a man who looks just like X and who is looking over
at him from under a blue light bulb--"is the original you. I know this must
be disconcerting, but you're really a dublicate. A moment ago, you didn't
exist. Then I turned on the duplicator, and there you were.

"Since the duplicator duplicates an object _exactly_, the duplicate person
has all the memories of the original. Indeed, you seem to remember agreeing
to have yourself duplicated, and lying down under the blue light."

X's jaw goes slack, and he lets himself fall back down on the bed while the
awful truth sinks in. Finally, he sits up again, and says, "Yes, I guess it
makes sense. Boy, this is weird! I have no past! I'm a totally new person.
He looks over at his "twin", and says, "Me and you are gonna make one hell
of team."

Now, why is this problematic? I don't see any deep philosophical problem
here. (To be sure, there are certain practical difficulties...)

You might say that the matter changes drastically if _I_ am the one who
wakes up under the red light. But that can't be--not according to the story
you've told me. I will wake up under the blue light--my duplicate wakes up
under the red light. To be sure, he will seem to remember writing these
very lines--but he won't have written them.





--
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
             |      Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist.     |
Peter Cash   |       (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein)      |cash@convex.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


