From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!cs.utexas.edu!swrinde!mips!news.cs.indiana.edu!bronze!chalmers Tue Jan 28 12:16:52 EST 1992
Article 3083 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Xref: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca comp.ai.philosophy:3083 sci.philosophy.tech:1958
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!cs.utexas.edu!swrinde!mips!news.cs.indiana.edu!bronze!chalmers
>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Table-lookup Chinese speaker
Message-ID: <1992Jan23.222536.2572@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: 23 Jan 92 22:25:36 GMT
References: <1992Jan22.204734.20123@cs.yale.edu> <1992Jan22.221225.2877@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Jan23.182858.114022@cs.cmu.edu>
Organization: Indiana University
Lines: 26

In article <1992Jan23.182858.114022@cs.cmu.edu> tp0x+@cs.cmu.edu (Thomas Price) writes:

>David, if I understand you correctly you are saying that the point
>of the Room is that the Turing test can be beaten by a theoretically 
>possible system but not by a practically possible one, and therefore
>debates about 'mentality' have to take into account practicality. Yes?
>If so, could you elaborate a little on how this might be done?

That's not precisely what I'm saying; but I believe that consciousness
arises from certain kinds of complexly organized processes, and that
any system that passes the Turing test in practice would have a complex
organization of the requisite kind.  The reason for the "in practice"
clause is that it restricts to a certain manageable size, so that
sophisticated, highly organized processing will be required in order to
achieve sophisticated behaviour.

Another way to put it is that understanding arises from *generative*
mechanisms for achieving intelligent behaviour; and the trouble with
the lookup-table is that it isn't generative -- instead it has a
distinct mechanism for every situation that might come up.  I don't
know how to put this precisely, however.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


