From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!mcnc!ecsgate!lrc.edu!lehman_ds Tue Jan 28 12:16:24 EST 1992
Article 3051 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: lehman_ds@lrc.edu
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Intelligence Testing
Message-ID: <1992Jan22.203550.143@lrc.edu>
Date: 23 Jan 92 01:35:50 GMT
References: <11722@optima.cs.arizona.edu> <42064@dime.cs.umass.edu>
Organization: Lenoir-Rhyne College, Hickory, NC
Lines: 25

In article <42064@dime.cs.umass.edu>, orourke@unix1.cs.umass.edu (Joseph O'Rourke) writes:
> In article <11722@optima.cs.arizona.edu> gudeman@cs.arizona.edu (David Gudeman) writes:
>>It is impossible in principle for one agent to distinguish between
>>"knowledge" and "understanding" in another agent, because the
>>difference is only sensible to the agent who has (or doesn't have)
>>understanding.
> 
> It is also impossible in principle to exclude the possibility that
> we were all created a minute ago, memories intact, as Russell pointed
> out.  I was responding to the question of why conversation could be 
> strong empirical evidence for understanding.  If you define understanding 
> to require unobservable "internal self-awareness," then of course
> it is impossible to establish beyond the shadow of doubt.  But
> the common meaning of "understand" is "to grasp the meaning of"
> (Webster's 7th, definition 1a).  And I continue to believe that
> 
> 	][a deep conversation] could
> 	]constitute as strong an indication of the existence of understanding
> 	]as is conceivable.
   But that does little for your argument, because how can you tell the
difference between the act of understanding and the simple reponse we use
to judge the level of understanding?  If you have a way, I'd love to hear it.
  So, this does not seem to help either side.
    Drew Lehman
    Lehman_ds@lrc.edu


