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Article 3038 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Virtual Person?
Message-ID: <1992Jan22.235812.11080@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: 22 Jan 92 23:58:12 GMT
Article-I.D.: bronze.1992Jan22.235812.11080
References: <6028@skye.ed.ac.uk> <1992Jan22.195657.19911@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Jan22.224344.7404@aisb.ed.ac.uk>
Organization: Indiana University
Lines: 29

In article <1992Jan22.224344.7404@aisb.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:

>I don't follow you.  Searle argues about whether things understand
>merely by running the right program.  If the VP needs the "causal
>powers" (if, we might say, Chinese Rooms understand only because
>there's a person in them), then strong AI would still be in trouble,
>even though Searle's argument might need adjusting.

For Searle's argument to succeed, he has to exhibit an implementation
of the given program that doesn't understand.  If it turns out that
his own choice of implementation, for whatever reason, does understand,
then the argument's no good.  Of course that doesn't imply that
strong AI is automatically true, just that this particular argument
doesn't work.  

>Besides, there are lots of problems with the virtual person idea.
>For instance: Would it be murder for Searle to forget the program?
>Maybe these aren't problems that refute strong AI, but you do have
>to be careful when you start talking about "persons".  Certainly
>the claim that a new person would be created seems a bit strong.
>I'd be happier if the sys reply could get by with someting weaker.

Talking about the existence of conscious mental states is enough.
"Person" is just shorthand.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


