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Article 3015 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Virtual Person?
Message-ID: <1992Jan22.195657.19911@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: 22 Jan 92 19:56:57 GMT
References: <60287@aurs01.UUCP> <1992Jan18.222329.23953@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <6028@skye.ed.ac.uk>
Organization: Indiana University
Lines: 14

In article <6028@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.UUCP (Jeff Dalton) writes:

>I don't think the virtual person works all that well in any case.
>If the VP is in Searle's head (as when he memorizes the program),
>then perhaps it's benefiting from the "causal powers" of Searle's
>brian.

That's Searle's problem, not AI's.  It's Searle who wants to
argue that the VP doesn't understand.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


