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Article 3014 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: Searle Agrees with Strong AI?
Message-ID: <1992Jan22.195158.19394@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Organization: Indiana University
References: <1992Jan20.222309.16726@oracorp.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 92 19:51:58 GMT
Lines: 15

In article <1992Jan20.222309.16726@oracorp.com> daryl@oracorp.com writes:

>I don't consider 1. to be a failure of Strong AI as a philosophical
>position. Strong AI simply claims that implementing the right program
>produces understanding. If it happens to be impossible to produce the
>right program without using a human brain, then the Strong AI position
>becomes vacuously true.

Strong AI makes an existence claim: that there exists a program P such
that implementing P is sufficient for mentality.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


