From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Tue Jan 28 12:15:50 EST 1992
Article 3013 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Searle, again
Message-ID: <1992Jan22.185836.3278@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Jan20.175243.30222@spss.com> <1992Jan21.192710.18340@aisb.ed.ac.uk> <1992Jan21.233819.26595@news.media.mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 1992 18:58:36 GMT

In article <1992Jan21.233819.26595@news.media.mit.edu> minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes:

>Consider that theology is just bluster, yet most people take it
>seriously.  The anti-strong-AI is clearly a religious issue, not a
>philosophical one, because there isn't any well-defined test for
>sentience, intentionality, consciousness or any of the other terms at
>the core of that debate.

Well, then, belief in Strong AI is similarly a religious issue, for
precisely the same reasons delineated above.

Of course, the above can only be true if one, like Minsky, asserts
the vacuity of philosophical analysis.  This seems to me to be a rather
extreme position.

- michael



