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Article 2969 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Building Artificial Animals (was Re: Cargo Cult Science)
Message-ID: <16831@castle.ed.ac.uk>
Date: 21 Jan 92 20:33:27 GMT
References: <YAMAUCHI.92Jan16220910@heron.cs.rochester.edu> <1992Jan17.232633.12123@a.cs.okstate.edu>
Organization: Edinburgh University
Lines: 24

In article <1992Jan17.232633.12123@a.cs.okstate.edu> onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR) writes:

>  Ah but now what you have is something that looks like a mouse but
>may not be a mouse.  Until you know what a mouse is in its truest and
>purest ontological form, which would include access to its own 
>epistemology however rudimentary, I'm afraid all you have is something
>that resembles and isn't.

Unless one is a philosophical behaviourist. If one finds this rather
unpopular position too implausible, then one might believe that is in in
principle impossible for any mind to "know what a mouse is in its truest
and purest ontological form" (the strongest form), or merely that it is
practice impossible for a human mind to "know what a mouse is in its
truest and purest ontological form" (the weakest form). If one holds
either of these beliefs, or any of the versions of intermediate strength
(and it so happens that any of them are true :-) then your comment is
vacuous.

(There is no assertion so plausible but that some philosopher can be
found to deny it :-)
-- 
Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205


