From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!think.com!samsung!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!bronze!chalmers Tue Jan 21 09:27:14 EST 1992
Article 2897 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Virtual Person?
Keywords: personal identity, searle
Message-ID: <1992Jan19.213104.10775@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: 19 Jan 92 21:31:04 GMT
References: <1992Jan16.040733.23764@cs.yale.edu> <6007@skye.ed.ac.uk> <1992Jan19.132659.3061@cs.yale.edu>
Organization: Indiana University
Lines: 13

In article <1992Jan19.132659.3061@cs.yale.edu> mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott) writes:

>It would be interesting to get a version of Searle's argument that
>starts by assuming behaviorist strong AI.  

Ned Block's giant look-up table does something like this.  "Psychologism
and behaviorism", Philosophical Review 90:5-43, 1981.  A nice paper,
even if you think the example's ridiculous.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


