From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Tue Jan 21 09:26:48 EST 1992
Article 2848 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Virtual Person?
Message-ID: <1992Jan17.215950.23479@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Jan16.194359.1160@cs.yale.edu> <1992Jan16.204346.903@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <60287@aurs01.UUCP>
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 1992 21:59:50 GMT

In article <60287@aurs01.UUCP> throop@aurs01.UUCP (Wayne Throop) writes:

[commenting on Drew McDermott's and David Chalmers' discussion of Searle]

>Searle (presumably) thinks that a single human body can't support multiple
>minds, which point is needed to really make a contradiction and complete 
>Drew's summary of his argument.

I think it is more accurate to say that Searle does not believe that
a single *brain* can support multiple minds, at least not without each
mind being aware of the other. 

However, as far as I can see, Searle does not have a specific explicit
argument against the Virtual Person reply per se.  He merely repeats that
to believe this it to believe that syntax is sufficient for sematics,
which he rejects.  BTW, this I think is still a damn good argument...

>But there are counterexamples.  Consider Siamese twins.  Or consider
>epilepsy patients "cured" by separating brain hemispheres.  In these
>cases there is concrete and persuasive evidence of multiple minds.
>
>The objection that these cases involve physically segregated brains
>is relevant,

Searle might very well argue that it is...

>        but consider also multiple personality disorder.  The
>claim can be made that MPD sufferers "really" have one mind, but this
>is certainly not obvious, and there is (as I understand it) even
>physical evidence (involving PET scans of brain function) that
>supports the genuine multiple-mind position.

I would be *very* wary of such an interpretation of MPD.  First of all,
there is by no means agreement that the traditional description of
MPD patients as having "multiple personalities" is in fact correct -
indeed, many psychologists and psychiatrists argue that the phenomenon
involves essentially role-playing, and that there is no "true" MPD.
Second, if we were to take *seriously* the possibility that such people
*do* have "multiple minds", then an enormous number of philosophical
problems arise, not the least of which is the ethical status of the 
various "minds".  Do they have the same rights as minds that *don't*
share a body?  Should we treat a MPD sufferer the same as Siamese twins?
Should we not try to "integrate" the various personalities or "minds",
since one could argue that this ends the independent existence of a mind?
Can various personalities commit actions which the others are not
ethically responsible for?  Can different personalities inherent property
("I leave all my worldly goods to Fred inhabiting the body of John Brown,
but *not* to Spike inhabiting the same body")?

As you can see, to take MPD as a case of multiple minds opens a morass
of problems.  Above I've just outlined some of the ethical considerations,
although there are many others, for example, in the area of personal
identity.  That is not to say that a "multiple minds" approach might not
be appropriate, but I think that, whatever people might claim, practice
indicates that we don't take this view very seriously (or, as indicated
above, we wouldn't try to "treat" it by killing off the various minds).

- michael


