From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!cs.utexas.edu!sun-barr!ames!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!usc!wupost!uunet!mcsun!uknet!edcastle!aiai!jeff Tue Jan 21 09:26:26 EST 1992
Article 2806 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: "causal powers"
Message-ID: <5999@skye.ed.ac.uk>
Date: 16 Jan 92 17:39:48 GMT
References: <UdR5JXC00UzxE1ZsRR@andrew.cmu.edu>
Reply-To: jeff@aiai.UUCP (Jeff Dalton)
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland
Lines: 21

In article <UdR5JXC00UzxE1ZsRR@andrew.cmu.edu> fb0m+@andrew.cmu.edu (Franklin Boyle) writes:
>David Chalmers writes:
>
>>No, Searle's position is independent of noncomputability.  The causation
>>relationship in question holds between a physical state and a concurrent
>>mental state ("brains cause minds").  This is a weird, somewhat
>>nonstandard use of the term "cause", but then Searle thinks that
>>H20 molecules "cause" liquidity too.
>
>Good point. I could never understand why Searle uses the term this way.

I think it's a good idea to read (or re-read) the 1st Reith Lecture,
otherwise known as Chapter 1 of _Minds, Brain, and Science_.  Searle
is aware this he's using something other than the most common notion
of cause, and he does a fairly good job of explaining his liquids
and solids examples.

This lecture should also dispell the notion which some people have
that Searle has not heard of emergent properties.

-- jd


