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Article 2782 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: throop@aurs01.UUCP (Wayne Throop)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: "causal powers"
Message-ID: <60285@aurs01.UUCP>
Date: 16 Jan 92 17:02:41 GMT
References: <60265@aurs01.UUCP> <1992Jan10.013529.28228@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <60273@aurs01.UUCP> <1992Jan14.193055.25025@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
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> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
>> throop@aurs01.UUCP (Wayne Throop)

>> Presumably then, [.. Searle thinks formal systems realized as computer
>> systems can't cause minds because of some noncomputability problem ..]
> No, Searle's position is independent of noncomputability.  The causation
> relationship in question holds between a physical state and a concurrent
> mental state ("brains cause minds").

Hmmmmm.  In which case, I remain puzzled.  Computers (and Chinese
Rooms, what with their cards and drawers and the operator's finger
keeping place in the index and whatnot) have physical states.  What
justification does Searle have for thinking that the physical states
of the human brain *can* "cause" (in his sense) a mind, while the
physical state of a computer or a CR cannot?

Noncomputability seemed like a nice reason.  If not that, what then?

Wayne Throop       ...!mcnc!aurgate!throop


