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Article 2771 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chandra@boa.cis.ohio-state.edu (B Chandrasekaran)
Subject: Re: Virtual Person?
Message-ID: <1992Jan16.125322.25008@cis.ohio-state.edu>
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References: <5965@skye.ed.ac.uk> <1992Jan16.040733.23764@cs.yale.edu> <1992Jan16.054723.16068@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 1992 12:53:22 GMT
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In article <1992Jan16.054723.16068@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes (about Searle)

>there is at least the skeleton of a noncircular argument
>there, i.e.
>
>Premise 1: If strong AI is true, then there exists a program P such that
>implementing P is sufficient for mentality.
>
>Premise 2: Any program P can be implemented Chinese-room style, without
>being accompanied by mentality.
>
>Conclusion: Strong AI is false.
>
This can't be the argument.  Premise 2 leaves open the possibility that
the program P can also be implemented non-Chineseroom style with the 
possibility of mentality, so the conclusion does not necessarily follow.
Premise 2 should be:

	Any program P can be analyzed Chinese-room style and thus shown not to
	have mentality.  

Now conclusion will follow.



