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Article 2751 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Cargo Cult Science
Message-ID: <1992Jan15.185958.11094@news.media.mit.edu>
Date: 15 Jan 92 18:59:58 GMT
References: <92Jan15.081805est.14473@neat.cs.toronto.edu>
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Cc: minsky

In article <92Jan15.081805est.14473@neat.cs.toronto.edu> mgreen@cs.toronto.edu (Marc Green) writes:
>It's clear from the discussion that advocates of Strong-AI, and
>computer scientists in general, don't have much understanding of
>empirical science. The essense of science is refutability. For any
>hypothesis to be taken seriously, it must be open to refutation. This
>means that the advacates must spell out exactly what evidence they
>would take as contradictory to the hypothesis. Well, what evidence
>would refute Strong-AI? 

Where did you get the idea that the essence of science is
refutability?  I know that it is popular among some philosophers, but
popularity is not good enough.  Yes, you can argue that a prediction
is wrong by finding arguments, or evidence against it.  But this is
not the "essence" of science.  The important thing is the art of
making correct theories and predictions.

The principal problem, in my view, with the "anti-strong-AI
philosophers" is that they talk about undefined essences like
'meaning' and intentionality' and the like.  The usual rhetorical
trick, then, is to sneak into the discource the notion that these are
irreducible attributes.  Then, of course, they can "prove" that they
are irredicible, and therefore cannot be reduced (to computational operations).

My point is that anyone except a trained philosopher should be able to
see that *correct theories can't be refuted* -- except, perhaps, by describing
worlds in which the predicted phenomena won't occur.

>I've never gotten a straight answer to this one. Usually I get the
>"someday defense." You know, "someday we'll be able to do this" or
>"someday we'll understand that."  Anybody looking at the statements
> by Feigenbaum, Simon, etc. over the last 30, 20 and 10 years knows
> how optimistic their predictions have been.

Of course you can't get a straight answer to "prove that you can be
build a human-like machine". Because you want to see the thing and
understand how it works -- and that is too complicated to be
"straight"!  Yes Simon once predicted that there would be a world
champion chess program in 10 years.  And that was refutable -- and in
fact was refuted.  But you're confusing the baby with the bath.  Only
a fool like Dreyfus and, I suppose, you, would predict -- as Dreyfus
did around the same time -- that no computer would ever play even very
good chess.  Today, those programs are at Intenrational Grandmaster
level, and, still growing.  So your arguments are too ad hominem.

> Belief in Strong-AI is like belief in God. The advocates simply can't
> understand how anybody could believe any differently or that there are
> no alternatives. Just ask a theist to say what evidence he would
> accept as evidence that god doesn't exist. You just get a blank stare,
> because to him, empirical evidence is not an issue.> 


Your first two sentences are about two different things.  If gOD
appeared, and did enough tricks, you'd accept hIM right off.  But you
can't refute a thing like that because you can't show that it's
impossible.  You've got a peculiar dose, I wonder from where, of your
own peculiar religion, namely, that funny idea about refutability.
The theist is right, in a sense, to argue that Negative empirical
evidence isn't the issue, when we're speaking about a question of
possibility in principle.


