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Article 2713 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: bhw@aifh.ed.ac.uk (Barbara H. Webb)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Causes and Reasons
Message-ID: <1992Jan14.154801.17701@aifh.ed.ac.uk>
Date: 14 Jan 92 15:48:01 GMT
Article-I.D.: aifh.1992Jan14.154801.17701
References: <1992Jan14.005053.15003@oracorp.com>
Reply-To: bhw@aifh.ed.ac.uk (Barbara H. Webb)
Organization: Dept AI, Edinburgh University, Scotland
Lines: 20

In article <1992Jan14.005053.15003@oracorp.com> daryl@oracorp.com writes:
>Searle certainly does claim that what is missing in
>a computer simulation of intelligence is "causal powers", but he fails
>to clarify *what* causal powers are missing. A robot with sensor
>certainly has some causal powers, so his argument that mere syntax
>cannot have such powers does not apply in the case of the robot.

I think this really hits the nail on the head: Searle is not wrong to
say that intelligence requires "causal powers"; where he is wrong is
when he says simulations on computers don't have _any_ causal powers,
rather than specifying exactly what causal powers are lacking. Computers
certainly do have causal powers, though it is quite possible that these
powers aren't sufficient for intelligence: strong AI assumes that they
are. Furthermore, as Searle's approach to understanding the mind, as
found in his writings on 'Intentionality', has not yet led to a complete
understanding of what causes our intelligence, AI researchers are
perfectly at liberty to disagree with Searle about what he thinks are
necessary powers. 

BW


