From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!bronze!chalmers Thu Jan 16 17:21:38 EST 1992
Article 2708 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: "causal powers"
Message-ID: <1992Jan14.193055.25025@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Organization: Indiana University
References: <60265@aurs01.UUCP> <1992Jan10.013529.28228@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <60273@aurs01.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 14 Jan 92 19:30:55 GMT
Lines: 18

In article <60273@aurs01.UUCP> news@aurs01.UUCP (news) writes:

>Presumably then, a case of what Searle has in mind here is a situation
>involving two mental states (represented by physical states), where one
>physical state is a consequence of (or "is caused by") the other, and
>where the consequence is not computable.  In this formulation, it
>exhibits a sort of family relationship to what Penrose proposes.

No, Searle's position is independent of noncomputability.  The causation
relationship in question holds between a physical state and a concurrent
mental state ("brains cause minds").  This is a weird, somewhat
nonstandard use of the term "cause", but then Searle thinks that
H20 molecules "cause" liquidity too.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


