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Article 2659 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: "causal powers"
Message-ID: <1992Jan12.215059.22371@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: 12 Jan 92 21:50:59 GMT
References: <60265@aurs01.UUCP> <1992Jan10.013529.28228@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Jan10.181709.50682@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU>
Organization: Indiana University
Lines: 18

In article <1992Jan10.181709.50682@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU> peterson@debussy.cs.colostate.edu (james peterson) writes:

>I would argue that the relevant "causal powers" are not the
>"abilities" to "cause a mind" but rather "of a mind." Searle writes:

The relevant causal powers, for Searle, are the powers of the brain
(NB not the mind) to produce a mind.  I recommmend reading Searle's
response to K.G. MacQueen in BBS recently ("The causal powers of the
brain: The necessity of sufficiency", BBS 13:164, 1990), to see 
Searle himself spell out how entirely trivial the claim about causal
powers is.  Which of course leads one to wonder why he bothers
talking about these "causal powers" in the first place, as they
add nothing new and simply seem to confuse the issue.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


