From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!ames!purdue!yuma!debussy!peterson Thu Jan 16 17:19:37 EST 1992
Article 2635 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: peterson@debussy.cs.colostate.edu (james peterson)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: "causal powers"
Message-ID: <1992Jan10.181709.50682@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU>
Date: 10 Jan 92 18:17:09 GMT
References: <5907@skye.ed.ac.uk> <60265@aurs01.UUCP> <1992Jan10.013529.28228@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Organization: Colorado State Computer Science Department
Lines: 41

In article <1992Jan10.013529.28228@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <60265@aurs01.UUCP> throop@aurs01.UUCP (Wayne Throop) writes:
>
>>Hence my question: is there anything that a human can cause that a CR
>>or a computer cannot?  If not, in what sense does the human have
>>causal powers (quoted or not) that the CR or computer lacks?
>>
>>At best, "causal powers" seems a very ill-chosen term.
>
>The relevant "causal powers" for Searle are the abilities to cause
>a mind, intentionality, subjectivity, and so on.  This is a point that
>very frequently gets lost in discussion. 


I would argue that the relevant "causal powers" are not the
"abilities" to "cause a mind" but rather "of a mind." Searle writes:

	[regarding our ability to understand English]

	...as far as we know it is because I am a certain sort
	of organism with certain biological (i.e. chemical and physical)
	structure, and this structure, under certain conditions, is
	causally capable of producing perception, action, understanding
	learning, and other intentional phenomena.  (from "Minds, Machines
	and Programs")

which I agree is slightly ambiguous, but it makes the difference between
asserting some mysterious underlying "powers," and powers with which
we are all familiar, viz., the power to voluntarily decide the course
our mental and physical lives will take, to make decisions, having
the "power" to "cause" plans to be made and carried out
(or not carried out, as we choose).  These are the "causal
powers" I take Searle to be talking about, and these are
the powers strong AI and cognitive science truly need to give an account of.


-- 
james lee peterson				peterson@CS.ColoState.edu
dept. of computer science                       
colorado state university		"Some ignorance is invincible."
ft. collins, colorado  (voice:303/491-7137; fax:303/491-6639)


