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Article 2616 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: "causal powers"
Message-ID: <1992Jan10.013529.28228@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: 10 Jan 92 01:35:29 GMT
References: <5907@skye.ed.ac.uk> <60265@aurs01.UUCP>
Organization: Indiana University
Lines: 22

In article <60265@aurs01.UUCP> throop@aurs01.UUCP (Wayne Throop) writes:

>Hence my question: is there anything that a human can cause that a CR
>or a computer cannot?  If not, in what sense does the human have
>causal powers (quoted or not) that the CR or computer lacks?
>
>At best, "causal powers" seems a very ill-chosen term.

The relevant "causal powers" for Searle are the abilities to cause
a mind, intentionality, subjectivity, and so on.  This is a point that
very frequently gets lost in discussion.  The claim that only something
with the right causal powers could think is therefore a conceptual truth
for Searle, not any kind of empirical claim.  And if one assumes that the
Chinese Room argument is correct, then the fact that humans have causal
powers that the Chinese room lacks is a trivial consequence.  It's not a
notion that can do any independent work for Searle or his followers,
although sometimes the phrase is waved around as if it could.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


