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Article 2492 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: Intelligence testing
Message-ID: <1992Jan4.001854.2209@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Organization: Indiana University
References: <1992Jan1.115429.2331@arizona.edu> <BSIMON.92Jan2070527@elvis.stsci.edu> <1992Jan3.122235.26340@aifh.ed.ac.uk>
Date: Sat, 4 Jan 92 00:18:54 GMT
Lines: 73

>In article <BSIMON.92Jan2070527@elvis.stsci.edu> bsimon@elvis.stsci.edu 
>(Bernie Simon) writes:

>>The Turing test is a behavioural test for intelligence and it is
>>unconvincing as a test for the same reason that Behaviourism is
>>unconvincing as an explanation of intelligence.

This is simplistic.  The "behaviourism" involved in the Turing test
lies only in the claim that there are behavioural *criteria* for
intelligence, whereas traditional behaviourism consists essentially
in the claim that there are behavioural *explanations* for intelligence.
The first claim is much weaker than the second, and much more plausible,
although it may well be false.

In article <1992Jan3.122235.26340@aifh.ed.ac.uk> bhw@aifh.ed.ac.uk (Barbara H. Webb) writes:

>A Behaviourist would most likely respond that the behaviour is perfectly
>possible without such processes --- because they believe it occurs in
>humans without such processes.

This is bizarre.  Any sane behaviourist believes that there are
internal processes going on (how could there not be? -- presumably
the brain is there for a reason).  They simply believe that appealing
to such internal processes cannot provide a satisfactory explanation
of behaviour; rather, all explanations must be ultimately grounded in
environmental contingencies.

>Searle and others also seem to think that the behaviour is perfectly
>possible without such processes (without 'real' intentionality,
>consciousness, thinking).

Now we're equivocating on "processes".  Searle certainly believes that
internal processes are necessary for intelligent behaviour -- even the
Chinese Room has complex internal structure, for instance.  He simply
doesn't believe that those processes will be conscious (or intentional,
or whatever).  Let's separate "process = complex internal function"
(the most natural reading) from "process = conscious awareness".

>If it _is_ possible, then what is the
>justification for supposing that such processes are necessary to explain
>human behaviour? Why not go along with the behaviourists? 

Answer to Q1: on this view, it's quite possible that consciousness is
irrelevant to explaining behaviour (this is something like my own
view).  Answer to Q2: this is nothing like behaviourism, as it still
may be the case that appeal to internal function is vital in explaining
behaviour.

>In summary, the Turing test (which ascribes 'thinking' to anything that
>exhibits the intelligent behaviour of a human) is based on the
>assumption that such internal processes are _necessary_ for the
>behaviour to occur. This completely contradicts the Behaviourist
>doctrine, as above, that the behaviour is in _no way_ explained by
>referring to such internal processes.

All equivocation on "internal processes" aside, I don't see any
contradiction in the two theses mentioned.  (Compare: a screen is
necessary for a television, but it doesn't explain the television.)

>One of the replies to my previous posting said that, well, they were
>using small-b behaviourist to mean 'someone that believed that observing
>the behaviour was sufficient to ascribe mental states (conciousness)'.
>This is perhaps a common usage, but has nothing to do with Behaviourism,
>or with the reasons Behaviourism was rejected. It also seems pointlessly
>tautological to append the description 'behaviourist', in this sense,
>to the Turing test.

I agree with this.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


