From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!ub!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!samsung!crackers!m2c!wpi.WPI.EDU!cs!rdouglas Mon Jan  6 10:30:26 EST 1992
Article 2485 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Xref: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca comp.ai.philosophy:2485 sci.philosophy.tech:1692
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!ub!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!samsung!crackers!m2c!wpi.WPI.EDU!cs!rdouglas
>From: rdouglas@cs.wpi.edu (***** Rob Douglas ****)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: red light / blue light scenario
Message-ID: <1992Jan2.220336.17131@wpi.WPI.EDU>
Date: 2 Jan 92 22:03:36 GMT
References: <1991Dec20.004238.11206@smsc.sony.com> <1991Dec19.222126.2296@arizona.edu> <1991Dec20.202630.14526@smsc.sony.com> <1991Dec21.104936.2301@arizona.edu>
Sender: news@wpi.WPI.EDU (News)
Reply-To: rdouglas@cs.wpi.edu (***** Rob Douglas ****)
Distribution: world,local
Organization: Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Lines: 64
Nntp-Posting-Host: maxine.wpi.edu

In article <1991Dec21.104936.2301@arizona.edu>, bill@NSMA.AriZonA.EdU (Bill Skaggs) writes:
|> >  Tomorrow Mr. Skaggs is going to be the subject of an actual
|> >  experiment which may involve creating a duplicate of him.
|> >  Today he is given the proverbial two choices, allowing him
|> >  to determine which of these two experiments will be performed
|> >  tomorrow:
|> >
|> >  1)  Tomorrow he'll be duplicated.  The duplicate will have a Very
|> >      Horrible Thing happen to him.  The original Mr. Skaggs will have
|> >      a Very Nice Thing happened to him.
|> >
|> >  2)  Tomorrow no duplication will take place.  The one and only
|> >      Mr. Skaggs will face a lottery.  There is a 1 in 10 chance
|> >      that a Very Horrible Thing will happen to him, and a 9 in 10
|> >      chance that a Very Nice Thing will happen to him.
|> >
<some deleted stuff here>

|> I would choose option (1).  Before I explain why, let me note that
|> by the evolutionary criterion of maximizing my genetic fitness,
|> option (1) is clearly preferable:  it leaves two copies of me,
|> each of which is potentially capable of replicating, and one of
|> which has had a Very Good Thing happen to it.
|> 
|> Now of course people (me included) don't make decisions by 
|> calculating the effect upon their genetic fitness --- they do
|> it by visualizing each option and imagining how it would
|> *feel*.  I can easily do this for option (2), but I can't
|> for option (1).  When I try to visualize option (1), I find
|> that my tendency is to identify myself with the copy that has
|> the Very Good Thing happen to it, and ignore what happens to
|> the other copy --- myabe because I don't like to visualize
|> Very Horrible Things happening to me.  Since the copy I
|> identify with myself is certain to have something good happen
|> to it, I prefer this option.
|> 
|> I'm the first to admit that this decision is not based on
|> deep philosophical grounds, so I would be quite skeptical of
|> any attempt to draw deep philosophical conclusions from it.
|> 
|> 	-- Bill

As you will note, the phrasing of the conditions of choice 1) above almost forces
one to identify with the Mr. Skaggs.  The being to whom the Very Horrible Thing
happens is called the duplicate, and the being to whom the Very Nice Thing
happens is called Mr. Skaggs.  However, try replacing 1) with this:

     1.1)  Tomorrow he'll be duplicated.  Some Very Horrible Thing will happen
           to one of the copies, and some Very Nice Thing will happen to the 
           other.  There is a 50-50 chance of these things happening to either
           copy.

Now there is no reason to identify yourself with the Mr. Skaggs who has the Very
Nice Thing happen to him.  How does this affect the choice you make.  Do you
automatically identify with the original Mr. Skaggs, and notice that there is a 
50% chance that he will cease to exist (making the lottery look better) or do you
reason the way you did in your first paragraph, that two you's will continue, one
having a maximal genetic fitness.

Anyone else have an answer, I am curious as to how many would now choose option 2)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~ rdouglas@cs.wpi.edu <<<< Rob Douglas >>>> Worcester Polytechnis Institute ~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


