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Article 4139 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Antun Zirdum)
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <1992Feb28.191119.21637@ccu.umanitoba.ca>
Organization: University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
References: <1992Feb25.175012.8924@oracorp.com> <1992Feb28.022105.28548@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Feb28.165550.13014@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Fri, 28 Feb 1992 19:11:19 GMT
Lines: 45

In article <1992Feb28.165550.13014@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>In article <1992Feb28.022105.28548@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>>bunch of rules could produce another mind.  But people with the
>>capacity to memorize a whole Chinese-room rule set would be vastly
>>different to anything in our experience: 
>
>But Dave, surely "maybe things get radically different when they get
>really complex" is just no argument at all. As I suggested earlier,

Surely you can't be serious! So there is no life, gee I keep looking at
biological cells, and the only thing I find is a bunch of chemicals!
Never have I seen *any* life inside of a cell! I guess then that
airplanes don't fly, for the reason that we can put together something
complex, but the properties of those things can never change, so
I cannot *get* the property of flight!

>try the same project with an artifical language of, say, five symbols
>and three rules. Then try it with ten symbols and six rules. Try it
>with, say, all of the propositional calculus. That's a pretty complex
>artificial language that is syntactically specififed. Is there any hint
>that something mysterious is going on; that consciousness might slowly
>be welling up of it own volition (pun intended)? No. Not one iota.
>There's just no reason to believe that the syntactic specification
>of Chinese would induce any such thing. Hofstadter and Dennett are
>just thrashing about looking for a "maybe".
>
Chris, I for one am getting really tired of this extreme solipsism 
position. Take a newborn infant (please), IS THERE ANY INDICATION
THAT SOMETHING MYSTERIOUS IS GOING ON? That consciousness might
slowly be welling up of its own volition? No. Not one iota!

The only consciousness that you will get any evidence of is
*YOUR OWN*. I am aware that extreme solipsism is irrifutable,
however I am tempted to post a refutation! Heck, if Searle can
convince you with his argument then my refutation of extreme
solipsism should really convince everybody on this net!
Either agree with me on the above, or post something to
convince me that you know that a newborn is conscious!
	Go ahead, I dare ya, Nya Nyany, Nya Nya! (well, Searle
does it in his article, why can't I!)
-- 
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*   AZ    -- zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca                            *
*     " The first hundred years are the hardest! " - W. Mizner  *
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