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Article 4121 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: rab999@mesrx.UUCP (robert a brauch)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <735@mesrx.UUCP>
Date: 28 Feb 92 02:27:22 GMT
References: <43956@dime.cs.umass.edu> <1992Feb26.170232.8676@psych.toronto.edu> <CHANDRA.92Feb26131732@cannelloni.cis.ohio-state.edu>
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In article <CHANDRA.92Feb26131732@cannelloni.cis.ohio-state.edu> 
chandra@cannelloni.cis.ohio-state.edu (B Chandrasekaran) writes:

[stuff ommited]

>Question: Is "understanding" such a term?  Do the specifics of the
>thought experiment "break" the word and its meanings in a similar way?
 
[as in the mother example]

>In order to answer it I suggest that we expand on the behavioral 
>analysis of the phrase "understand a language."

>When I think I understand a language L (say for the sake of the argument,
>in addition to a mother tongue, M), the following complex of behavior
>(some internal and some external) are seen to happen:

>ii. Given sentences in L, I can have in my awareness, if I choose,
>additional sentences *in L*, which are in some sense consequences of
>understanding the given sentences in L.  That is, I can think in L,
>similar to my ability to think in M.  The CR experiment in my view
>*does not satisfy* this sense of understanding a language.  The man in
>the room only "thinks in English". He can't think in L in the sense of
>going from a sentence in L to another sentence in L, unmediated by
>sentences in M.
  
>Thus even those who are only interested in "behavioral" definition of
>understanding should be able to conclude that some of the
>*behavioral* features of "understanding a language" are not present.
>The question then is: What is the need to insist on the sense ii above?  

Usually, when someone talks about a behavioral definition, she is contrasting it
to things like "having things in one's awareness", or "thinking in English".
This is precisely what is at issue in the CR thought experiment etc.  Does the
man who has memorized all the rules have any awareness of Chinese?  ie Does he
think in Chinese?

By hypothesis, the man could pass any conceivable behavioral test of understanding.
We may or may not insist on ii.  However, the question of having *any* sentences 
in L in one's awareness is prior to having *additional* sentences in L in one's 
awareness.


	-Rupert


