From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!tdatirv!sarima Thu Feb 20 15:22:20 EST 1992
Article 3888 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!tdatirv!sarima
>From: sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: MUST Philosopy be a Waste of Time?
Message-ID: <428@tdatirv.UUCP>
Date: 19 Feb 92 21:03:58 GMT
References: <409@tdatirv.UUCP> <1992Feb13.195506.23701@psych.toronto.edu> <416@tdatirv.UUCP> <1992Feb16.194200.13547@psych.toronto.edu>
Reply-To: sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen)
Organization: Teradata Corp., Irvine
Lines: 203

In article <1992Feb16.194200.13547@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
|>logic is a *tool* *used* by philosophy, it is not itself philosophy.
|
|Logic can be used as a tool, but it is also an area of philosophy itself.

I guess this is mostly a matter of definitions.
Given my definitions of mathematics and philosophy, logic *by* *itself*
is a branch of mathematics, not of philosophy.  This is mainly because
logic is essentially algorithmic given a particular axiomatic base.  I do
not think this gives much scope for debate in logic, just room for choices
of axiom systems.

Logic as *used* by science and philosophy is a form of applied mathematics.


Now it is true that *historically* logic originated as an aspect of philosophy,
but so did science, so that says little about its current status.

|I must admit not knowing enough about the development of fuzzy logic to
|disagree here, although I am greatly suspicious of this claim.

I too am not 100% certain here, but the earliest references I know of to
this class of reasoning is in mathematical papers on an alternative axiom
formulation of logic.

|Scientific arguments are not *always* resolved by observation and testing.
|[insert Copernican astronomy example here]

Even here observation and testing were critical.  It is true that not all
of the observations involved were *astronomical*, but if the theory had
not explained the data as well or better than the geocentric model it
would have been thrown out.

It is true that, given two models that are equally predictive, scientists
prefer to use the simpler one, and this is, strictly speaking, a philosophical
bias.

|Apart from this, the original claim is getting lost.  I am merely saying that
|scientists use philosophically developed methods and approaches, including
|logic, in doing their work.

Alright, I will admit this.  Especially since I myself do use logic where
appropriate.
|
|>My point about axioms and assumptions is that the only ones of any real value
|>are those based on observation, or which follow directly from some definition.
|>All others are immediately suspect.
|
|This *in itself* is a philosophical position, like it or not.  "All truth
|comes from observation" is a philosophical maxim, which itself needs
|philosophical justification.

Or practical justification - it works, the other ways of deriving assumptions
have been shown by experience to be unreliable.  That is all the justification
I need.

|>In its heyday, yes, but not so much now.
|
|Then it serves as an example of how philosophy can impact science, even
|if the particular movement cited is no longer influential. 

I suupose a large part of our difference is in our relative weightings of
various factors.  I consider the impact of logical positivism on science
to be largely negative, and so I consider it a failed experiment.  As such
it is more evidence that philosophy has relatively little to *contribute* to
science (even where it has impact).

|>And even then the *best*, most productive scientists were the ones that
|>just got on with the job and didn't let little things like a philosophical
|>concept constrain thier research program.
|
|Who do you include amongst the "*best*" scientists of this time?  Certainly
|the most influential psychologists and physicists were in the grips of
|positivism...

But how many of those made discoveries or advances that are still valuable
today?  How many made significant, lasting, *new* discoveries?  I would suspect
that only the first few to use that approach, because they would have been
using the approach in some field where it was appropriate and applicable,
whereas the followers would have been trying to apply a fashionable method
outside of its competence.  [That is onoe or a few people applied logical
positivism and got exciting new results so everyone else jumped on the
bandwagon].

|>In short, where there *are* repeatable results that work *all* the time,
|>they are accepted into science.  Science is how we got computers and
|>a cure for pneumonia.  Can shamanistic religions match that kind of track
|>record - no, not even close.
|
|You miss my point.  We in the West have a materialist philosophy that does
|not admit spirits, ghosts, and other such entities as valid terms in
|explanations.

If we could come up with a way to demonstrate the effects and interactions
of such things that was reproducible, we would eventually accept them.

Why do you think our 'Western' materialism has rejected spirits as
explanations?  They were taken for granted at the beginning of the
scientific revolution.

Could it not be that it was the consistant failure to demonstrate any
reliably observable effects that could not be attributed to physical
causes that led to rejecting spiritualism?

It is rather another case of 'why postulate unnecessary entities?'

|I do not question that science has produced great advances, and that it
|has some kind of approximation to "truth."  That is not the question.  The
|question is *why* we believe this.  If it is merely because it can *explain*
|the world, other worldviews can also do this.  If it is merely because we
|get repeatable phenomena, a) other worldviews can also get repeatability, and
|b) repeatability is *not* the same as understanding. 

Other culture do *not* get the same *level* of repeatability as the scientific
method, and it is the repeatability that allows technology.  It is what
allows us to *use* the explanations.  A spiritualist explanation that involves
'the god's didn't feel like it' is not usable when reliability is needed.

|>If it produces practical results.  It it allows one to make plans and rely
|>on them working.  If it provides the capability to build something.
|>
|>In short, if it can be *used* *reliably*.
|
|OK, so why should we take these criteria to yield "truth"?   Again, using
|no philosophical concepts.

Perhaps I do not consider truth to be achievable.  So utility is the only
achievable criterion for accepting or rejecting a potential explanation.

How do *I* know if something is 'true' or not?  But I *can* know if it
works or not.

|>I am not sure what you are getting at here.
|
|That to claim that all that matters is observables is a philosophical
|claim.  This position would deny the importance (or perhaps even reality)
|of theoretical terms which cannot be observed.  

Well, maybe not the reality, but certainly the relevance. (Since 'truth'
is unavailable, reality is an unanswerable question - and since it is
unanswerable, it is uninteresting).

If I cannot use a concept, it has no relevance to any problem I am
dealing with.

|>It is an approach to knowledge in which observation takes primacy over
|>any and all theory.  It involves converting each problem into a *testable*
|>form, devising a set of tests, performing them, and interpreting the results.
|
|Then, as noted above, the decision to believe Copernican astronomy did
|not rest on the scientific method.

Perhaps not entirely, at least not at the time.

Still, it is remarkable that when Newton's mechanics were added to the
'equation', they made essentially the same predictions as the Copernican
model.  This constitutes additional validation of the model, and moves
it onto a more sound footing.

|>There are additional rules - the tests must be performable by any qualified
|>operator, they must produce repeatable results, and they must be described
|>along with the results.
|
|Where have all these rules come from, if not from an analysis of what we
|want science to achieve?  Are they merely "folklore" passed down from
|generation to generation, "hey, *this* seems to work!"

Some of both.

|>What about Hume do you have in mind here.  I have almost certainly read
|>some of his work while I was in college.
|
|I was referring to Hume's problem of induction.  

Hmm, still not enough to trigger my memory.
(Or I suppose it is possible that the assigned selections did not include
that aspect of his work).

|>But reason is only a *tool* in science, *pure* reason is reason *alone*,
|>without any observations to back it up.
|>
|>I do not object to reason, only to *pure* reason.  Only to using reason as
|>an end in itself.  Only to using reason by itself.
|
|If this is your position, then we may not be terribly far apart.  Reason alone
|cannot do science - empirical work *is* necessary.  But to believe that
|all advances in knowledge come only through empirical testing it naive and
|wrong.

I hope I never said that.

There is no doubt in my mind of the importance of models in scientific work.
It is impossible to interpret results without a context, and it is impossible
to generate useful questions without a one either.


My main point is that tools should be chosen as appropriate to the job
at hand, and not to rely too heavily on unverified ideas (even where
they prove temporarily useful).
-- 
---------------
uunet!tdatirv!sarima				(Stanley Friesen)



