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Article 3875 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: dlyndes@gothamcity.jsc.nasa.gov (David Lyndes)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Intercourse with the Forms (was re: Intelligence Testing)
Message-ID: <1992Feb19.194552.6316@aio.jsc.nasa.gov>
Date: 19 Feb 1992 19:45:52 GMT
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[DL]
>>|> But the problem remains: namely
>>|>
>>|>(1) platonism explains mathematical ontology and truth quite nicely but
>>|>    fails to explain its utility and epistemology, while [...]
 
[Mikhail Zeleny, MZ] 
>|> This is hardly a problem, provided that one is serious about the causal
>|> role of the Forms.  Epistemology and pragmatics haunt half-baked Platonists
>|> only; the truly insane among us find that there's nothing wrong with
>|> anamnesis, let alone the erotic epistemology of the later Plato.
 
[DL]
|> Quite so.  I have no arguments.  Only an uneasiness about causal relationships
|> with the forms.  As a side issue, since you seem to be the resident
|> platonist (or at least the most forthcomming), how might the form-matter
|> kind of causality be integrated with the rest of physics, and should
|> it be integrated?

[MZ]
> Since the Forms exist outside of the space-time continuum, it isn't at all
> clear to me that the question of our causal interaction with them belongs
> to the purview of physics.  

Nor to me - the forms seem the wrong kind of "stuff" - hence my question.
Being a different kind of stuff, we should expect the corresponding
causality to be different (re. Aristotle's "formal cause").

If you don't mind, I'd like to set out a number of positions and get
your response to them - do you agree with the position?  Disagree? 
Agree, but with reservations, or requires clarification?

(1) Causal interaction with the forms should *NOT* be understood as
    - something "out there" interacts with the physical world through
      some sort of nexus.
    That is, there is no pineal gland for the forms.  The forms are not
    a different kind of billiard ball.

    (Please forgive the metaphores - platonism has often been portrayed
    in this "plato's heaven" sort of way.  I've never found this
    appropriate even for Plato.  If this "anti-position" is too unclear,
    maybe the next "position" will help.)

(2) Formal causality (i.e. form-matter causality) should be understood
    in terms of "matter being in-formed".  The intelligible *STUCTURE*
    of a physical object is the "manifestation" of the form in the
    object.

(3) The structure of an object has a lot to do with how it behaves,
    determining (for example) the object's dispositions, and many
    of its properties.  (Perhaps this is what Leibniz was getting at
    with his "intrinsic denominations" - a concept he became interested
    after he returned to "essential forms" c.1680.)

(4) There are relationships which hold between forms.  These relationships
    (MZ: all or only some?) are studied by mathematicians.  In-formed
    objects manifest these same relationships in virtue of their
    structure.  (Perhaps this is Leibniz's "extrinsic denominations.  If
    so and in conjunction with (3), this makes sense of his "there
    are no purely [intrinsic/extrinsic] denominations" comments.  Any
    Leibniz scholars out there?)

(5) Many objects can be in-formed by the same form.  "Objects" are
    not limited to ordinary middle-sized physical objects.  On the
    contrary, other forms, (volitional or non-volitional) actions, or
    composite objects (such as my library or some particular society
    of people) may also be in-formed.

(6) Epistemology:  One acquires knowledge of a form by becomming
    in-formed in some particular way by that form.  That is, the
    brain (for materialists) or mind (for functionalist, cartesians,
    and what not) acquires a structure which gives it the properties
    and relationships characterized as "knowledge of that form".

    I included the phrase "in some particular way" because simply
    being in-formed is not enough.  One can be the 1st in a line
    at the movies without understanding "first".  There must therefore
    be some additional constraints.

(7) Linguistics:  Terms referring to forms are formed from count nouns
    (MZ: but not mass terms?) by adding a suffix like -hood, -ness, or
    -ity.

(8) Pragmatics: The success of (for example) mathematics is accounted for
    by the fact that physical objects are actually in-formed in the
    ways that the mathematics describes.

>                             I don't believe that we should expect that in
> the long run biology and psychology will mutate into branches of physics;
> after all, a similar reduction of mathematics to logic has failed for
> well-known reasons.

Reductionism seems to me to be a distinct issue from platonism.  One may
(in the large) be pro or con either independent of one's position on the
other.  However, some forms of platonism require (or even be defined as)
anti-reductionism of some stripe or other.  Is this later your view?

Do you have any recommended readings on modern platonism?
-- 
+-------------------------------------+---------------------------------------+
| David K. Lyndes                     | "I assure you that all reasonable     |
| Barrios Technology                  |  precautions have been and are being  |
| email: dlyndes@deltahp.jsc.nasa.gov |  taken." - General Margrave           |
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| The opinions expressed are not necessarily those of my employer nor of God. |
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