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Article 3789 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: Implementation (was: Re: Causes and Reasons)
Message-ID: <1992Feb16.223809.19674@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Organization: Indiana University
References: <1992Jan29.005249.10405@aisb.ed.ac.uk> <6538@pkmab.se> <6183@skye.ed.ac.uk>
Date: Sun, 16 Feb 92 22:38:09 GMT
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In article <6183@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:

>What I want to know is why does David Chalmers need his restricted
>notion of implementation?
>
>1. It limits his conclusions.
>
>For instance, he doesn't conclude that if we write an understanding
>program in Lisp, then running it on any machine that will run it
>produces understanding, and if we translate it into Prolog it still
>works.

I answered this already: A limited conclusion is plenty strong enough
for the purposes of establishing a strong "strong AI".  I think that a
less limited conclusion is also true, but arguing for that view is
more complex and isn't necessary e.g. to argue against Searle.

>2. He doesn't need it to say that programs specify causal systems.
>
>He could do that with a broader / weaker notion of interpretation.
>However, the class of causal systems would be larger.

I agree, I could do it.  It would just take more work, and I don't
think it's necessary.  Note, however, that the definition couldn't be
weakened all the way to allow any compiler with I/O equivalence.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


