From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!csd.unb.ca!morgan.ucs.mun.ca!nstn.ns.ca!aunro!ukma!darwin.sura.net!jvnc.net!yale.edu!think.com!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!bronze!chalmers Thu Feb 20 15:20:38 EST 1992
Article 3717 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!csd.unb.ca!morgan.ucs.mun.ca!nstn.ns.ca!aunro!ukma!darwin.sura.net!jvnc.net!yale.edu!think.com!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!bronze!chalmers
>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Strong AI and panpsychism
Message-ID: <1992Feb13.235239.10843@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: 13 Feb 92 23:52:39 GMT
References: <1992Feb12.182033.4183@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Feb12.224832.305@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Feb13.020232.10408@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Indiana University
Lines: 82

In article <1992Feb13.020232.10408@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:

>My concerns are *precisely* with how we use certain concepts.  You want to
>rule out time-dependent definitions of states, and Putnam would like
>to include them (at least, as far as I understand his argument).  My
>problem is I see no way of adjudicating between you two. 

Because we're dealing, essentially, with the pre-theoretical concept
of "causal organization", and trying to find a good definition of it
that accords reasonably well with the pre-theoretical notion (as is
the case with all definitions).  If Putnam's proffered definition has
the consequence that simple clocks have the same causal organization
as the brain, then that provides entirely adequate grounds for ruling
it out as a definition (compare: if someone offered a formal
definition of "heat" that had the consequence that Antarctica and
the Sahara were equally hot, then we'd rule it out of court).

>However, note that it is not *necessarily* the case that we have
>all the relevant facts in this instance either.  *If* Putnam is
>right, then any arbitrary lump instantiates any FSA.  This, on
>my reading of it (which admittedly may be wrong, and I welcome clarification),
>indicates that any arbitrary lump of matter instantiates the *functional*
>relations of our brain.  If this is the case, then rocks possess the 
>requisite functional states for consciousness/qualia/experience/whatever.
>One gets panpsychism.  

Perhaps the problem is that you haven't read Putnam's proof?  We do
indeed possess all the relevant facts about the lump.  All the proof
requires is that the lump be in different states at different times,
a requirement that would be satisfied by a structureless ball rolling
down a hill.  Nothing in the proof involves finding out things about
lumps that we didn't know before (e.g. that the laws of physics
guarantee that they are seething with internal structure).

>Again, my apologies if we're not connecting.  Let me try one last time.
>As I note above, consciousness for me is *not* a matter of interpretation,
>but a matter of *fact*.  Now, it may very well be that states which have
>time-dependent definitions are *in fact* sufficient to generate consciousness.
>At least, this seems to be to be possible.  Yet, you seem to rule this
>possibility out a priori.  What I want to know is why.  If you have
>an argument as to *why* Putnam-type states are not appropriate functional
>states, that would be fine (you have already suggested the counterfactuals
>criticism).  But it seems to me that simply to rule them out a priori
>is not sufficient.

As you know, I'm also a realist about consciousness.  But what we are
doing now is trying to formulate some kind of theory about the physical
basis of consciousness.  The starting point for this is the hypothesis
that consciousness (at least complex consciousness of the kind that
humans have) arises from complex functional organization, of the kind
that brains have and rolling balls don't.  Of course this is just based
on plausibility considerations, but any theory about consciousness has
to rely on plausibility considerations somewhere along the way.  There
aren't any *proofs* when it comes to consciousness, as almost any
theory you can imagine is logically possible, and empirical evidence
is hard to come by.

*Given* these plausibility considerations, then we want to formulate
an adequate definition of "functional organization" so that we can
put our thesis more precisely.  But the definition has to cohere with
the very considerations that led us to adopt it.  If a definition has
the consequence that a simple clock has the same functional organization
as the brain, then it's the wrong definition.  The key thing here is
that definitions are our servants, not our masters.  The notion
of functional organization came first; the definition is entirely
subservient to it.

[This is a fairly pointless argument in any case, if I am correct
that Putnam's lumps don't instantiate the right counterfactual
relations.  It's likely that this failure is precisely what is behind
our pre-theoretical notion that lumps don't have the same organization
as the brain.  My point here is just that one doesn't *need* such a
detailed analysis to know that rolling structureless lumps don't have
the same causal organization as the brain; it's part of the very
concept of causal organization.  But this is a sufficiently esoteric
point, and far enough off-topic, that future discussion should
probably go to e-mail.]

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


