From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Thu Feb 20 15:20:31 EST 1992
Article 3704 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: MUST Philosopy be a Waste of Time?
Message-ID: <1992Feb13.195506.23701@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <403@tdatirv.UUCP> <1992Feb11.190201.20670@psych.toronto.edu> <409@tdatirv.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 13 Feb 1992 19:55:06 GMT

In article <409@tdatirv.UUCP> sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) writes:
>In article <1992Feb11.190201.20670@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>|In article <403@tdatirv.UUCP> sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) writes:
>|>
>|>This is why I do not accept *anything* said by a philosopher that does not
>|>have at least *some* observational basis.
>|>
>|Poor guy. Then you must not believe in modus ponens, or the law of 
>|contradiction. It's astounding that you survive the day. :-)
>
>I would consider those as being more in the way of mathematics than pure
>philosophy.

Huh?  Logic is not philosophy?!  Yow, stop the presses!!!!

>Besides, I only 'believe' them when I am doing classical bimodal logic,
>when I am reasoning using real-valued logic (also called fuzzy logic) they
>are *not* true.

And who developed formalizations of fuzzy logic?  Scientists?

>Also, I find that classical logic has little *practical* value.  Most real
>problems are in finding the correct axioms or premises, not in the deductions
>from them.  Too many purely logical arguments are based on questionable
>axioms for them to be treated as more than suggestions of one possible reality.

Be careful.  Axioms and premises are not completely interchangable.
And while it may be true that too many purely logical arguments are based
on questionable "axioms", too many purely scientific arguments are based
on questionable logic.

>Thus, if I see someone using modus ponens or some such thing, I usually
>ask him to *demonstrate* his axioms, rather than just expound them.
>(This is what I meant by observational basis - axioms are only useful if
>based on observation).
>
>|>I would pay more attention to one scientist than any number of philosophers.
>|
>|And tell me, How did that scientist get his theory of knowledge, or his
>|theory of truth? Or is he, like most scientists, pretty fuzzy on both
>|concepts.
>
>Probably, since in actual practice neither really contribute much to how
>science is actually done.

What?!  Logical positivism had a *profound* impact on the way science
was done in its heyday.  Just check any history of science... 

>Most decent scientists are essentially pragmatists, they go with what works,
>and the scientific method has an excellent track record in that regard,
>independent of any philosphical bases.

Nonsense.  Many shamanistic religions also have methods that "work" within
the culture in which they exist.  It is only because we *philosophically*
refuse to admit the entities that they posit as having reality that
these systems are not labelled some form of "science".  We have alternative
accounts as to the way the universe works.   

>Or you might say that most scientists have a theory of truth rather like:
>"If it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and looks like a duck, it must
>be a duck".  In short, if a model works, act like its true until it doesn't.

Define "works" without using any implicit philosophical concepts.

>|Does he have any ethics?
>
>I think most do.
>(I certainly do, and I think of myself as a scientist).

Then philosophy is at least important in this regard.  (Just ask anyone
working in animal research of the effect Peter Singer's book
_Animal Liberation_ has indirectly had on their practice of science.)

>|Does he wonder about his conceptual
>|distinctions (like between matter and non-matter)?
>
>Why is this even relevant to science?  What matters is observables.

*This* is a philosophical position!

>|Does he have any more
>|real education than, say, your average engineer?
>
>What does this have to do with anything?
>If he has the specialized training necessary to do his work, and he
>does it competently, then he will get usable, reliable results.
>
>|Or does he just plod
>|along thinking the usual dumb-ass stuff like that "Some X are Y" implies
>|(at leat "probabilistically", whatever that might mean) that "All X are Y"?
>
>No, he says, "all observed X are Y, so for now I will act as if all X are Y".
>Or, "If most X are Y, then it is a safe bet that any given X is a Y".
>
>|And that "All X are Y" implies that "All Y are X" (at least sometimes)?
>|Please say you're being hyperbolic and not just plain foolish.
>
>Some probalby do, but that is a general human failing - it is how neurological
>systems "reason" unless forced to do otherwise.

We're not talking about a *descriptive* account of science, but a *normative*
account.  If scientists reason poorly, or illogically, then they are doing
poor science.  Note that "reason" and "logic" are at least partially
defined by philosophers.

>Most of the competent scientists do not let such failing greatly effect
>their work.

Well, maybe they bloody well should!


>   Actually, a large part of the scientific method (repeatability,
>independent verification and so on) is aimed at revealing this kind of error.

You keep talking about "The Scientific Method."  Could you state what it
is?

>The bottom line is, I trust a scientific result because the scientific approach
>has shown itself to be reliable in the past.

You should read some Hume.

>I do not trust pure reason because it has so often lead to useless results.
>It is too easily mislead by incorrect asumptions or isolated false data.
>Science, because it is self-correcting, is not so gullible.

Science without reason is witchcraft.

- michael





