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Article 3693 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: MUST Philosopy be a Waste of Time?
Message-ID: <409@tdatirv.UUCP>
Date: 12 Feb 92 23:37:09 GMT
References: <1992Feb04.060419.21963@convex.com> <1992Feb05.011716.8427@norton.com> <403@tdatirv.UUCP> <1992Feb11.190201.20670@psych.toronto.edu>
Reply-To: sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen)
Organization: Teradata Corp., Irvine
Lines: 88

In article <1992Feb11.190201.20670@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
|In article <403@tdatirv.UUCP> sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) writes:
|>
|>This is why I do not accept *anything* said by a philosopher that does not
|>have at least *some* observational basis.
|>
|Poor guy. Then you must not believe in modus ponens, or the law of 
|contradiction. It's astounding that you survive the day. :-)

I would consider those as being more in the way of mathematics than pure
philosophy.

Besides, I only 'believe' them when I am doing classical bimodal logic,
when I am reasoning using real-valued logic (also called fuzzy logic) they
are *not* true.

Also, I find that classical logic has little *practical* value.  Most real
problems are in finding the correct axioms or premises, not in the deductions
from them.  Too many purely logical arguments are based on questionable
axioms for them to be treated as more than suggestions of one possible reality.

Thus, if I see someone using modus ponens or some such thing, I usually
ask him to *demonstrate* his axioms, rather than just expound them.
(This is what I meant by observational basis - axioms are only useful if
based on observation).

|>I would pay more attention to one scientist than any number of philosophers.
|
|And tell me, How did that scientist get his theory of knowledge, or his
|theory of truth? Or is he, like most scientists, pretty fuzzy on both
|concepts.

Probably, since in actual practice neither really contribute much to how
science is actually done.

Most decent scientists are essentially pragmatists, they go with what works,
and the scientific method has an excellent track record in that regard,
independent of any philosphical bases.

Or you might say that most scientists have a theory of truth rather like:
"If it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and looks like a duck, it must
be a duck".  In short, if a model works, act like its true until it doesn't.

|Does he have any ethics?

I think most do.
(I certainly do, and I think of myself as a scientist).

|Does he wonder about his conceptual
|distinctions (like between matter and non-matter)?

Why is this even relevant to science?  What matters is observables.

|Does he have any more
|real education than, say, your average engineer?

What does this have to do with anything?
If he has the specialized training necessary to do his work, and he
does it competently, then he will get usable, reliable results.

|Or does he just plod
|along thinking the usual dumb-ass stuff like that "Some X are Y" implies
|(at leat "probabilistically", whatever that might mean) that "All X are Y"?

No, he says, "all observed X are Y, so for now I will act as if all X are Y".
Or, "If most X are Y, then it is a safe bet that any given X is a Y".

|And that "All X are Y" implies that "All Y are X" (at least sometimes)?
|Please say you're being hyperbolic and not just plain foolish.

Some probalby do, but that is a general human failing - it is how neurological
systems "reason" unless forced to do otherwise.

Most of the competent scientists do not let such failing greatly effect
their work.   Actually, a large part of the scientific method (repeatability,
independent verification and so on) is aimed at revealing this kind of error.



The bottom line is, I trust a scientific result because the scientific approach
has shown itself to be reliable in the past.

I do not trust pure reason because it has so often lead to useless results.
It is too easily mislead by incorrect asumptions or isolated false data.
Science, because it is self-correcting, is not so gullible.
-- 
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uunet!tdatirv!sarima				(Stanley Friesen)


