From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Thu Feb 20 15:20:22 EST 1992
Article 3690 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael
>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and Panpsychism
Message-ID: <1992Feb13.014116.9941@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Feb10.213422.4256@aisb.ed.ac.uk> <1992Feb11.042319.3356@psych.toronto.edu> <6171@skye.ed.ac.uk>
Date: Thu, 13 Feb 1992 01:41:16 GMT

In article <6171@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>In article <1992Feb11.042319.3356@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:

>>And I'm still waiting to find out *why* a lookup table *doesn't*
>>have beliefs under a functionalist view (assuming that a lookup table
>>can reproduce "belief-behaviour", which was the original assumption
>>offered by Chalmers).
>
>Becuase it doesn't have the right functional organization.

*Why* do you think that beliefs involve some sort of "special"
functional organization?  Is it *only* to rule out lookup
tables having them?  If so, this is simply ad hoc...


>I know you will find that completely unsatisfying.  However, the
>first step is to see whether there's any point in trying to say
>what the right functional organization is.  Quite a few people
>who post here, and (I think) most of the ones who keep asking
>for definitions of this sort, seem to think that there can't
>be such a definition; that the only "objective" (insert favorite
>"like good science" adjective here) definitions will be in terms
>of behavior.

Gack!  I am by *no* means a behaviourist, and my position is
quite the opposite, in fact.  My argument is that behaviour *can't*
be the basis for a definition of belief - some reference to 
conscious states is needed.  (I'm not as firm on this as I once
was, after my exchange with Chalmers, but for now I'll stick with
it.)

>Now, if you can accept that there can be a rfelevant difference
>in functional organization, don't you think it's at least unlikely
>that simple table lookup would do the trick?

Again, why not?  Until we have a clear unpacking of what a potential
relevant difference *is*, I have no reason to think that a table
lookup *couldn't* have "beliefs" in the functional sense.  

To lay out my cards more openly, I agree that simple table    
lookup *doesn't* have beliefs.  This seems to be agreed upon by
most of the functionalists on the net as well.  However, *I* see
no *important*, *principled* difference between table lookup
and other functionalist approaches.  Ergo, I see no reason to
think that *other* approaches could generate beliefs.  If someone
could provide an account of the critical difference between non-believing
table lookup and some other believing system, then we can discuss the
criteria.  As it stands, all I see is empty assertion...

- michael 




