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Article 3668 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Reference (was re: Multiple Personality Disorder and Strong AI)
Message-ID: <1992Feb12.063035.15857@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu>
>From: bill@NSMA.AriZonA.EdU (Bill Skaggs)
Date: 12 Feb 92 06:30:35 GMT
Reply-To: bill@NSMA.AriZonA.EdU (Bill Skaggs)
Sender: news@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu
References: <1992Feb4.214433.9121@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Feb7.162533.4653@cs.yale.edu> 
 <1992Feb7.232150.8611@husc3.harvard.edu> <1992Feb12.040025.14716@cs.yale.edu>
Organization: Center for Neural Systems, Memory, and Aging
Keywords: consciousness,functionalism,meaning
Lines: 42

In article <1992Feb12.040025.14716@cs.yale.edu> 
mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott) writes:
>
>I don't claim to have a full theory of meaning, but what we need for
>the present purpose is an explanation of "System P has a model M of
>system Q."  (In particular, we're interested in the case where P=Q.)
>It seems to me to be sufficient if 
>
> [1]  M is a part of P
> [2]  M goes through transitions that fairly reliably track or anticipate
>the properties of Q.  (I.e., the states of M are "approximately"
>homomorphic to the states of Q.)
> [3]  P's behavior with respect to Q is caused to be "appropriate" by the
>states of M (or, if you prefer, the outputs of M)
>
> [ . . . ]
>
>I don't think the occurrence of terms such as "approximate" and
>"appropriate" should be held against the theory.  [ . . . ]

[I inserted the numbers -- Bill]

  "Approximate" is all right, but "appropriate" carries a lot
of baggage.

  Your definition is actually stronger than necessary.  When
you require the behavior of the system to be "appropriate", you
are in effect assuming rationality, and thereby taking the
intentional stance toward the system.  But "model" is only
a functional, not an intentional, characterization.  You
can replace [3] with the weaker (functional) requirement
that M be *used* as a model by P.

  For example, consider a thermostat, in which the length of a
piece of metal serves as a model of a room (or, at least, of
the temperature of the room, which is the only aspect the
thermostat cares about).  Even if the thermostat is malfunctioning
(i.e. behaving inappropriately), the length of the piece is
still a model of the temperature, because it was *designed* to
play that role.

	-- Bill


