From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!csd.unb.ca!morgan.ucs.mun.ca!nstn.ns.ca!news.cs.indiana.edu!bronze!chalmers Thu Feb 20 15:20:09 EST 1992
Article 3666 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!csd.unb.ca!morgan.ucs.mun.ca!nstn.ns.ca!news.cs.indiana.edu!bronze!chalmers
>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and panpsychism
Message-ID: <1992Feb12.071505.9490@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Organization: Indiana University
References: <1992Feb10.164653.15748@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Feb11.223848.7203@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Feb11.230220.8739@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: Wed, 12 Feb 92 07:15:05 GMT
Lines: 37

In article <1992Feb11.230220.8739@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

>>(Incidentally, the more I think about Putnam's proof, the more I come
>>to the conclusion that this discussion is irrelevant, because it
>>seems to me that his "FSAs" don't have the required counterfactual
>>behaviour, especially in response to inputs and outputs.)
>
>Given that their behavior is subject to the same physical laws as that of
>physically implemented FSA's, I find this claim to be wildly implausible.

As I can't see how this statement constitutes a coherent argument, you'll
have to elaborate if discussion is to go anywhere.

My problems with Putnam's "proof" are roughly

1. He sets it up so that the rock does indeed go through some actual
sequence of states ABABAB... during a given time interval.  But an
FSA must also satisfy counterfactuals e.g. of the form "if it had
been in state C, then it would have transited into state D".  Given
that the physical states corresponding to most states C (i.e., all
those that aren't in the actual desired sequence between 12:00 and
12:07) aren't even defined, this would seem to be a problem.

and, perhaps more seriously,

2. An FSA certainly must satisfy counterfactuals of the form "if
in state S, input I had come in, then it would have transited to
state T", for all counterfactual inputs I.  Putnam makes some
tentative gestures in the direction of handling a certain pattern
of actual inputs, but says nothing at all about handling
counterfactual inputs.  As far as I can tell, the required
counterfactual sensitivity is entirely lacking.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


