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Article 3595 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: jbaxter@physics.adelaide.edu.au (Jon Baxter)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Functionalist Theory of Qualia
Message-ID: <jbaxter.697533284@adelphi>
Date: 8 Feb 92 07:14:44 GMT
References: <1992Feb4.160229.20899@cs.yale.edu> <1992Feb4.193653.25027@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Feb5.220638.9673@cs.yale.edu> <1992Feb6.055620.23808@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
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I am not a philosopher (at least I'm not paid to be a philosopher), however
the key issue for me in this "where do qualia come from" debate is whether
it really is "Logically possible to imagine a universe identical to ours
in all respects, except that there are no qualia."

>From a materialist's viewpoint such a universe seems entirely plausible
(even preferable to ours as things would make far more sense) for there
is no denying that the whole functioning of the brain, from the molecules
up, can be (or will one day be) understood using ordinary scientific
principles. However, there is one lasting problem with the materialist's
viewpoint, and that is the problem of wave-function collapse in quantum
mechanics. 60 odd years after the invention of quantum mechanics, the
theory that is the basis of all materialism still cannot explain how a
physical system evolves from a superposition of states into particular
eigenstates. In my opinion, this "hole" in our knowledge undermines all
materialistic descriptions, including any such descriptions of brain function.
In particular it is not true to say that we understand how the brain
operates from the ground level up: we see brains in definite states, quantum
mechanics says we shouldn't.

Arguments about qualia invoking inadequecies in quantum-mechanics may seem
pretty far-fetched, especially when we view qualia as being supervenient on
incredibly complex physical processes such as brains exhibit. However I think
David Chalmers has argued pretty convincingly for the existence of qualia in
far simpler things than brains, things as simple even as electrons absorbing
photons. David seems to see qualia wherever there is "information processing
of the right kind". This feels to me to be on the right track, and it also
has the makings of a materialistic solution to the phenomenon of qualia. For
if we can quantify exactly what is the "right kind" of information processing
in say an electron-photon system, then perhaps there will be a link between
this kind of information processing and an explanation of wave-function
collapse. In particular, wave function collapse seems to have something to
do with irreversible change, irreversibility is a function of the entropy
change in a physical system, and entropy is just another way of saying
information (in the strict Shannon/Weaver sense).

Maybe, just maybe, the solution to a 60 year-old problem in physics will
furnish a solution to a 2000 year-old problem in philosophy (or vice-versa).

Jonathan Baxter

School of Information Science and Technology,
Flinders University of South Australia.


