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Article 3583 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: cash@convex.com (Peter Cash)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Empirical Irrefutability of Philosophy
Summary: I refute myself.
Message-ID: <1992Feb07.190357.12743@convex.com>
Date: 7 Feb 92 19:03:57 GMT
References: <1992Feb6.031729.14889@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Feb06.044858.27264@convex.com> <1992Feb7.050537.26358@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
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In article <1992Feb7.050537.26358@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <1992Feb06.044858.27264@convex.com> cash@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes:

>>"Commonly held" by whom, I wonder?  Certainly by neither philosophers nor
>>physicists.

>By both: at least by the ones I know.  Put it this way: interactionist
>dualism is widely held to be false; but if we had opened up our heads
>and found nothing but sawdust inside, so that there were large
>physically inexplicable causal gaps between stimulus and action,
>then interactionist dualism would have been widely held to be true.
>So the plausibility of interactionist dualism depends strongly on the
>empirical facts.

Let me see if I understand your argument. You say that the ability to
establish a causal chain that accounts for human behavior in some way
disproves "interactionalist dualism". (Such a chain hasn't been
demonstrated, of course--but I will grant it for the sake of argument.)

>From this, I conclude that when you speak of "interactionist dualism" you
must be thinking of the sort of dualism that envisions "mind" as a sort of
nebulous causative agent that moves the human body like a puppeteer moves a
puppet. You are arguing that this sort of dualism seeks to provide an
_explanation_ of human behavior--and that this explanation is false because
you have a better one (the mechanistic neuro-phyiological one, presumably).
You are saying that--in theory--it is possible to explain every human
action completely in physical mechanistic terms, and that the mental
mechanism is therefore spurious or redundant.

If I am interpreting you correctly, then your claim is narrow; for example,
you wouldn't say that your physiological "causal chain" refutes, say,
epiphenomenalism--or, for that matter, idealism. You think you refute only
dualism, and only a particular kind of dualism. However, you think that
this proves your important assertion: that philosophical problems can--at
least occasionally--be refuted by empirical evidence.

You have not proven your point, for this proof requires philosophical
assumptions that have themselves not been proven in any way--nor are they
subject to empirical proof. The key assumptions I see in your proof revolve
around the nature of "cause". To make your proof, you must assume that you
know just what a "cause" is, and you must make the assumption that any event
can have only one cause. 

You are, of course, free to posit a philosophical view of causation. (I
would, by the way, like to see you express this view clearly and
explicitly; I don't think you can.) This view governs how you interpret
empirical evidence--it cannot be _established_ by empirical evidence. 

Thus, even if I grant you the "chain of causation" in regard to the
neurophysiological antecedents of human behavior, an interactionist dualist
could argue that nothing binds him to believe that an event can have only
one cause, and that volitional behavior has _both_ mental and physical
causes.

			-------------------

Having said this, it occurs to me that you could reply as follows: "True,
you have shown that there is a way out for the interactionist dualist.
However, for me to make my case, I don't have to show that interactionist
dualism has been refuted by neurophysiology. I just have to show that it's
possible to formulate _one_ philosophical theory that can be empirically
disproven (or proven). So let's take the case of an interactionist dualist
who also holds the view that every event can have only one cause. If
neurophysiology demonstrates a causal chain that lies at the root of
volitional actions, then _this_ theory has been refuted, hasn't it?"

And I would have to admit that you're right. Here is something that
certainly _looks_ like a philosophical theory that has been refuted
empirically. So where does this leave my contention that philsophical views
can never be subject to empirical proof or disproof?

One possibility is that this view is not really a philosphical one; that it
is something else masquerading as philosophy. The dualistic theory that
I've sketched out provides what is really a _mechanistic_ picture that
purports to explain certain phenomena--human actions that we call
"volitional". True, the mechanism has non-corporeal components--but it is
nevertheless a mechanism (a mechanism with intangible gears and levers). In
other words, this theory has the _form_ of a scientific explanation: it
holds that there is an explanation for volitional acts, and that the
explanation involves a "chain of causation" with immaterial links. And
inasmuch as it has any meaning at all, it is (empirically) falsifiable.

The trouble with saying that interactionist dualism (and if I am going to
be honest, I might as well admit that interactionist dualism in general
shares the structural features I've noted above) isn't philosophical
is that it plainly is. It is "philosophical" in that it has been recognized
as such by the philosophical tradition, and I would be a liar if I said
otherwise. To be specific, dualism is part of what has been traditionally
called "metaphysics".

So I find myself wondering: how did I get into this? Why did I want to
assert (mistakenly) that no philosophical problem can ever be empirically
verified or falsified? The truth is that this is how _I_ view philosophy: I
think that metaphysics is a mistake; I think that philosophy ought to
consist _only_ in conceptual investigation. Thus, I expressed my own
prejudices about philosophy when I made my claim about the empirical
irrefutability of philosophical assertions; I mistakenly presented my own
views about philosophy as though they were uncontroversial and obviously
true. In fact, my views are at least somewhat controversial (a more
traditionally inclined philosopher would probably not agree with me), and
do require some justification. I apologize for making it seem otherwise; I
can only say that I was myself not clear about this.

I do want to point out that while my views are not uncontroversial, they
are not without parallell, and there are numerous philosophers who would
agree with me. These include many who were heavily influenced--as I am--by
Ludwig Wittgenstein.
 
Wittgenstein observed that the essential feature of metaphysics is that it
confuses the distinction between factual and conceptual questions. (Thanks
to Hakki Kocabas for quoting the relevant passage in talk.philosophy.misc
recently, and reminding me of it.) I think we have here a prime example of
this: the interactionist dualist philosophy is bad science (some would call
it "pseudo-scientific" or "mystical") masquerading as philosophy. If we
take it seriously as philosophy, then we tread on the toes of science (and
are likely to find ourselves justifiably trodden in turn).

I want to thank you, David, for helping me understand this better.
-- 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
             |      Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist.     |
Peter Cash   |       (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein)      |cash@convex.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


