From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!cs.utexas.edu!sun-barr!ames!haven.umd.edu!darwin.sura.net!udel!rochester!cantaloupe.srv.cs.cmu.edu!tp0x Tue Feb 11 15:25:22 EST 1992
Article 3549 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Xref: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca comp.ai.philosophy:3549 sci.philosophy.tech:2077
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!cs.utexas.edu!sun-barr!ames!haven.umd.edu!darwin.sura.net!udel!rochester!cantaloupe.srv.cs.cmu.edu!tp0x
>From: tp0x+@cs.cmu.edu (Thomas Price)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Projected Intentionality
Message-ID: <1992Feb06.194644.132242@cs.cmu.edu>
Date: 6 Feb 92 19:46:44 GMT
References: <1992Feb6.032659.11087@a.cs.okstate.edu>
Organization: School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon
Lines: 45
Nntp-Posting-Host: spica.fac.cs.cmu.edu

In article <1992Feb6.032659.11087@a.cs.okstate.edu> onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR) writes:
> I have termed this [deleted] sort of thing, elsewhere, 
> "projected intentionality" where 
>an intentional agent projects "intentionality" into an inanimate
>object.  

Alternatively, the person who is "projecting intentionality" could simply
be trying to change the meaning of the word "intentionality" -- or, if
you prefer to say it this way, trying to change the scope of the concept 
"intentionality."

>I think this is indicative of the anthropomorphic nature of
>a lot of epistemological approaches.  

Would I be out of line if I asked you to justify the tacit assumption that
debate isn't about the scopes of the concepts involved but rather presupposes
them to be static throughout the debate? 

>Particularly those who try to
>determine animal intelligence and animal language capability; all
>the while having stated that humans are the only things capable
>of language and intelligence.  These definitions usually mean "something
>that looks like human behavior and is different than animal behavior; so
>much so that it might not be behavior but something else more mysterious
>."  Anyway, along the same line an individual who wants to claim that
>a thermostat has beliefs is falling into the problem of
>projected intentionality.  

Charles, what do you think of the role of metaphor in thought? Could you relate
it by way of explanation to what is problematic for you in the "anthropomorphic
nature of a lot of epistemological approaches"?

>Charles O. Onstott, III                  P.O. Box 2386
>Undergraduate in Philosophy              Stillwater, Ok  74076
>Oklahoma State University                onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu

Tom

*******************************************************************************
Tom Price				
Autodidact in Philosophy
Research Fabulist and Part-Time User Services Clerk
Carnegie Mellon School of Computer Science
tp0x@cs.cmu.edu                         
Disclaimer: Free Will? What Free Will?


