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Article 3473 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Multiple Personality Disorder and Strong AI
Message-ID: <1992Feb4.193653.25027@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: 4 Feb 92 19:36:53 GMT
References: <1992Feb4.035646.11687@cs.yale.edu> <1992Feb4.043521.11469@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Feb4.160229.20899@cs.yale.edu>
Organization: Indiana University
Lines: 26

In article <1992Feb4.160229.20899@cs.yale.edu> mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott) writes:

>I hardly need to point out that the zombies of the type I am
>advocating would automatically have Chalmers-style qualia by virtue of
>being information-processing systems.

Not if it lives in the qualia-less universe next door, it won't!  It
will have plenty of beliefs about qualia, but no qualia.

>So on either theory they succeed in having qualia.

Hang on, I thought on your theory qualia were "fictions", i.e.

  "the correct move...is...to stop looking for actual qualia in the system"
  "the quale of vivid green is essentially an internal fiction"
  "the inescapable feeling that my sensations *really do* have ineffable
   qualities is due to the fact that I can't get out of the story my brain
   is making up."

Or do you want, somehow, to identify qualia with the beliefs one has about
qualia?

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


