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Article 3446 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Strong AI and Panpsychism
Keywords: panpsychism
Message-ID: <1992Feb4.044728.12324@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: 4 Feb 92 04:47:28 GMT
References: <1992Feb2.000933.29482@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Feb2.053646.625@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Feb2.192512.24293@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Indiana University
Lines: 49

In article <1992Feb2.192512.24293@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:

>Well, I must say that our intuitions are different.  I would certainly
>argue that if *I* had no awareness of *all* my "beliefs", I
>would think the term to be mis-applied to the states being labeled.
>In this case, "beliefs" are merely *ascribed*.  In my view, what
>distinguishes "true" beliefs from merely ascribed beliefs is that
>the former carry phenomenal baggage, whereas the latter do not.

Well, one can argue this kind of intuition about the application of
terms forever, but the bottom line for me is that there seems to be
no *value* in insisting that beliefs must have a phenomenal tinge.
If we insisted on that, we'd just find ourselves inventing a new
term, e.g. "schmelief", for the kind of quasi-belief that a zombie
could have; and we'd find that schmeliefs do all the work for us that
beliefs do in practice.  Belief is a concept that seems to play its
main role in the prediction and explanation of action, so it seems
to me (and to most philosophers of mind) that it should be construed
as a functional notion.

>A Venus Fly-trap closes when an object brushes its hair-triggers.  Does it
>close because it *truly* believes that there is a fly?  Or is that
>merely an way of using intentional talk to describe a non-intentional
>act?  I think the latter.

More likely, it doesn't believe because it doesn't have the functional
complexity required of a believer.  Even if we require that beliefs
be introspectively accessible, remember that even introspection can
be characterized as a psychological, rather than a phenomenological
notion, e.g., as a criterion that's probably too strong, we might
require that possession of a belief requires the ability to verbally
report it.

>Indeed, one alternative way of looking at the question of "unconscious"
>beliefs is that the use of the term "belief" in such cases is merely
>taking an "intentional stance" toward states which aren't *really*
>beliefs. 

Well, I think that the "intentional stance" analysis of belief is a
pretty good one (not perfect, but a good approximation).  Of course,
an intentional-stance analysis of phenomenological concepts is hopeless.
But if we insist that all psychological concepts require a phenomenal
tinge, then it's going to be pretty hard to do any psychology, given the
mysteries that qualia pose.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


