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Article 3425 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: smoliar@maclane.iss.nus.sg (stephen smoliar)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and panpsychism (was Re: Virtual Person?)
Message-ID: <1992Feb3.100645.12871@nuscc.nus.sg>
Summary: How "situated" are we?
Sender: usenet@nuscc.nus.sg
Reply-To: smoliar@iss.nus.sg (stephen smoliar)
Organization: Institute of Systems Science, NUS, Singapore
References: <1992Jan31.153800.8987@watdragon.waterloo.edu> <1992Jan31.193524.28969@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Jan31.233453.7625@news.media.mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 3 Feb 1992 10:06:45 GMT

In article <1992Jan31.233453.7625@news.media.mit.edu> minsky@media.mit.edu
(Marvin Minsky) writes:
>
>When you close your ideas and try to prove Fermat's last Theorem
>your internal actions rapidly become less and less "situated" in the
>room you're in.  Yet still you think.  Because of memory.  And it
>would not matter if those memories can from some "genuine, early,
>experience" or if someone just inserted a new ROM in your brain.
>
This is a very nice abstract vision, but I am not sure I buy it.  Perhaps the
problem is that motor behavior figures very heavily in my own activity.  Yes,
there are times when I "shut down" and try to concentrate on a problem, drawing
only upon my memory;  but more often than not, I am DOING things while I puzzle
out such problems.  I would claim that such DOING is neither peripheral nor
irrelevant.  Sometimes the routine PHYSICAL manipulation of the symbols I am
working with because the fertile ground from which the symbol combinations I
happen to seek emerge.  Granted, this may not be consistent with any dogmatic
view of "being situated;"  but it makes me think twice about whether thought
can really be abstracted from the "situation."

This current emphasis on the motor side also makes me wonder about whether or
not my brain CAN have a new ROM inserted.  Suppose that which is really in my
brain is some amalgam of sensory, motor, and cognitive experiences, all far too
tightly coupled to be factored out in any clean way.  Suppose, further, that
"what is in there" can never be captured as some static state but is always
and only a dynamic process.  Such a state of flux could well make any sort
of imaginary "brain transplantation"--even a simple substitution of
memories--nigh onto impossible.  We can, of course, imagine anything
we want;  but can we implement all our imaginations with flesh-and-blood
brains?
-- 
Stephen W. Smoliar; Institute of Systems Science
National University of Singapore; Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Kent Ridge, SINGAPORE 0511
Internet:  smoliar@iss.nus.sg


