From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Wed Feb  5 11:56:18 EST 1992
Article 3408 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael
>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and Panpsychism
Message-ID: <1992Feb2.191322.23599@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Feb1.215002.7208@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Feb1.235203.28395@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Feb2.050613.28988@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: Sun, 2 Feb 1992 19:13:22 GMT

In article <1992Feb2.050613.28988@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <1992Feb1.235203.28395@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>
>>But *surely* the reason that Strong-AI types are up in arms about the
>>Chinese Room is that they don't *just* want to explain *behaviour*, but
>>also *phenomenal states*.
>
>Well, whatever AI might want to do in principle, no AI work that I've
>ever seen has even begun to explain phenomenal states.  Mostly, insofar
>as AI is a branch of cognitive science at all, it's interested in
>modeling human function.  Of course, most people in AI have a stake
>in the claim that when human function is reproduced, those systems
>will have human-like phenomenal states, and I agree with that claim.
>But modeling phenomenal states isn't the direct goal of any work
>that I've seen.

I agree with the last sentence.  However, I still think that most
researchers in the AI field ascribe to "Strong-AI" and not "Weak-AI",
that when the human functions are modeled, phenomenal states are
actually produced.  As far as AI work *explaining* phenomenal states, I
don't think that that is its goal - rather, its philosophical *assumption*
is that reproducing the psychological states reproduces the phenomenal
states.  

>>Surely Dennett, in his latest
>>book "Consciousness Explained" sees his role, *as a cognitive scientist*,
>>to explain the subjective nature of experience.  Even eliminativists offer
>>some account as to why we are wrong to *believe* that there are such
>>things as phenomenal states (at least as popularly conceived).  
>
>Well, Dennett doesn't really believe in phenomenal states at all; the
>cognitive-science part of his book is a purely psychological account
>of human functional capacities.  When it comes to talking about
>qualia, he turns into a philosopher, and essentially denies their
>existence.  Similarly for the eliminativists you mention.  I'm not
>saying that work in cognitive science can't cast light on the qualia
>problem indirectly, but I am saying that work in cognitive science is
>almost never aimed at explaining qualia (except for those people who
>identify qualia with some psychological capacity, e.g. discriminative
>capacities, which is a mistaken identification in my view; those people
>might think they're explaining qualia, but they're not really coming
>to grips with the problem).

Well, explaining why qualia in fact *don't* exist is in some sense an
attempt to deal with the question.

In general, I agree that AI in general does not attempt to *explain*
qualia.  But I do think that its claim to, *in principle*, produce
minds with qualia (consciousness) is the most interesting feature
of the position, both to its proponents and critics.  Otherwise, it
would be just as controversial as weather modeling. 
 
>>More deeply, I think the reason that we *care* about
>>the psychological states from an ethical point of view is *because* of
>>their phenomenal components.
>>Indeed, it seems to me that if one had an entity which
>>exhibited such "psychological" states (states characterized by their
>>role in the causation/explanation of action), but did *not* possess
>>*phenomenal* states as well, then such an entity would *not* be an
>>object of moral concern.
>
>>In addition, even if the above were *not* true, it is *still* the case
>>that the vast majority of utilitarian systems are built on the importance
>>of *phenomenal* states.  I don't care if you *act* like I caused you pain -
>>I want to know if I *did* cause you pain, if you *experienced* pain.  This
>
>Well, I have different intuitions about this; in any case, I'm no
>ethicist and don't have deeply-held views on the matter.  But I
>think one can see that there is something wrong with the straight
>experience-based account of ethics by considering Nozick's (_Anarchy,
>State, and Utopia_, p. 42) "experience machine", the machine that drugs
>us and hooks our brain up in the right way, providing incredibly
>pleasurable experiences for the rest of our lives; it seems to me that
>this wouldn't be the most desirable way of life.  Personally I think
>that psychological states are more central to our identities as persons
>than phenomenal states, although I recognize that this could be argued to
>death back-and-forth.

Well, I think your right about *purely* experience-based accounts of
ethics, although I think some plausible modifications might make a
weakened version work better.  But, as you say, this could be debated
to death, and there are other issues more germane to this group that
could use the bandwidth.  Unless anyone else wants to pursue it, I'll
drop the issue of the role of phenomenal states in ethics, at least
for now.

- michael
 


