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Article 3389 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: Thermostats, consciousness and derived intentionality
Message-ID: <1992Feb2.044940.28079@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Organization: Indiana University
References: <1992Jan31.184254.9068@cis.ohio-state.edu> <1992Feb1.223105.9850@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Feb2.003155.24245@cis.ohio-state.edu>
Date: Sun, 2 Feb 92 04:49:40 GMT
Lines: 18

In article <1992Feb2.003155.24245@cis.ohio-state.edu> chandra@boa.cis.ohio-state.edu (B Chandrasekaran) writes:

>I violently agree and I thought that *was* the point of the rest of my
>posting.   In short, I was denying that thermostats have qualia,
>but was asserting that intentional agents have qualia.

I must have misunderstood.  I thought you were saying that qualia were
on a par with representations, whereas in fact you were saying that
instrumentalism about representations shouldn't lead to instrumentalism
about qualia?  OK, so we're agreed on strong realism about qualia and
some kind of instrumentalism about representation, but we differ in
that I think it's plausible that systems like thermostats actually
possess those real qualia.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


