From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Wed Feb  5 11:55:51 EST 1992
Article 3361 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
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>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and Panpsychism
Message-ID: <1992Feb1.194905.11602@psych.toronto.edu>
Keywords: panpsychism
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <21879@life.ai.mit.edu> <1992Jan31.190338.25107@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Jan31.231742.7415@news.media.mit.edu>
Date: Sat, 1 Feb 1992 19:49:05 GMT

In article <1992Jan31.231742.7415@news.media.mit.edu> minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes:
>In article <1992Jan31.190338.25107@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>>In article <21879@life.ai.mit.edu> minsky@transit.ai.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes:
>
>>>see, what they mostly share in common is
>>>_short_term_memories_about_recent_mental_states.  I don't believe that
>
>>But the whole notion of *mental* states (as opposed to physical or
>>functional states) *presumes* some sort of phenomenal component that
>>might just as well be call consciousness as anything else.  Otherwise
>>how do we know that they are mental, and how do we know what states
>>we are talking about?  My immune system has many states, and 
>>even has "memories" to an exent.  Yet I would not ascribe mental states
>>to my immune system, and only use the term "memories" metaphorically
>>(I know that some people, such as Dave Chalmers, might ascribe mental
>>states to my immune system, but then he doesn't deny the meaningfulness
>>of the term "consciousness").  It seems that to be able to even
>>*talk* of recent "mental" events  requires a notion of consciousness.
>
>Um, I should have said "partial brain states".  But I am puzzled by
>your idea that *anything* "might just as well be called consciousness
>as anything else.  Because I'm arguing that the things we call
>consciousness seem to be connected not with any old mental functions,
>but certain specific -- well, sorta specific -- kinds, namely those
>involving a bit of (short-term) memory.

My point is that the states that you identify as the "specific" ones,
namely, those involving "memory", we are *only* able to identify
precisely *because* they are *conscious* states.  If you can draw a 
principled distinction between memories and other changes of state that
are *not* the "specific kinds of mental functions" *without* reference
to the *mental*, then I would be more impressed.  As it is, my interpretation
of what you are saying in is that "consciousness is caused by specific conscious
processes" - which of course gets us nowhere.

- michael




