From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Wed Feb  5 11:55:50 EST 1992
Article 3360 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael
>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and panpsychism (was Re: Virtual person?)
Message-ID: <1992Feb1.194246.10778@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Jan30.171309.1168@memstvx1.memst.edu> <1992Jan31.211540.13945@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Jan31.173006.1194@memstvx1.memst.edu>
Date: Sat, 1 Feb 1992 19:42:46 GMT

In article <1992Jan31.173006.1194@memstvx1.memst.edu> langston@memstvx1.memst.edu writes:
>In article <1992Jan31.211540.13945@psych.toronto.edu>, michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>> In article <1992Jan30.171309.1168@memstvx1.memst.edu> langston@memstvx1.memst.edu writes:
>>>
>>>  In the discussion of consciousness in this thread, are we adopting the
>>>'objective' view of consciousness (as I try to argue), or a more third-
>>>person, subjective view?  If the subjective experience is what is
>>>being considered here as consciousness, I would argue that this could be
>>>explained as an agent's (or an agent's processes) goal-directed behaviour
>>>regarding incoming information.
>> 
>> It is not at all clear to me how "goal-directed behaviour" explains
>> *experience*.   The notions of "agent" and "goal" *assume* the notion
>> of consciousness, that which is to be explained.  I think that the
>> above definition is a standard one when taking the "objective view"
>> of consciousness, but it does nothing to explain experience.
>> 
>> - michael
>
>   Okay.  Let's start by clarifying what I meant by 'agent'.  I consider an
>agent to be any process or assemblage of processes that have some sort of
>interaction with its environment (however sparse it may be).  This is a la
>Minsky's agents, to draw a comparison.  By goal I was simply meaning to
>convey the concept of intentional progress towards a desired state.
                       ^^^^^^^^^^^                    ^^^^^^^

Both of the above terms are *mental* terms, which describe *subjective, mental*
states.  Using these terms won't do if you want an *objective*, third-person
account of consciousness.

[much explanation deleted]

>I am trying to convery here is that two identical agents (theoretically, now...
>I know that isn't possible at a complex scale...) subjected to identical
>external stimuli, will have different subjective experiences depending upon
>the active goals of the two agents.  And, if we are defining 'consciousness'
>as the subjective experience (as I think I have seen a few do), then this
>is my position on what that 'consciousness' is.
> 

I would agree that this account explains *differences* in subjective experience.
But I would argue that this still does not give an *objective* account of
how consciousness arises.

- michael


