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Article 5117 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: tolman%asylum.utah.edu@cs.utah.edu (Kenneth Tolman)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Categories: bounded or graded?
Message-ID: <1992Apr15.134743.8440@hellgate.utah.edu>
Date: 15 Apr 92 19:47:42 GMT
Article-I.D.: hellgate.1992Apr15.134743.8440
References: <1992Apr14.143822.10246@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Apr15.010721.17700@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu> <1992Apr15.150901.10959@news.media.mit.edu>
Organization: University of Utah CS Dept
Lines: 53


>>is that natural
>>categories are not defined by invariant features, but rather
>>by radiation from prototypes.  

And indeed, this is nearly correct.

>Consequently, what we
>usually need is something that sandwiches the definition between the
>two aspects: structural (that is, of the examples) and functional
>(that is, of the intended purpose or usage of the category). 

And this is even closer.

(sit back and relax)

Lets examine where the object arrives from.  In the case of an animal,
we have the genetic evolution which is clearly a form of radiation of
form.  However, it is not radiating from a "prototype", rather from
a whole slew of forms.

In the case of a created object, it is a form arising from concept- which
itself is a radiation of form from the internal model.

However, as was pointed out, our functional aspects have bearing.  In
evolution, we have separate evolution of the same form (wings for example)
This is a functional consideratio- the insect,dinosaur, and bird all evolved
these independently in search of function.  And now we can describe all
of these with the term "wing".

In created objects, we have the same convergence.  I may see a rock, and
decide it is my chair.  Here I have used an aspect of its functionality
as my definition of its nature.

Now comes the bonus question: What is it we really mean when we are
referencing something?  

The problem is that I may talk about a rock, knowing it is my chair, and
you are thinking about it as a place to put peas on.  We may be unaware
of the others functional form, yet still talk about the same thing.
Indeed, it is often an act of "genius" to take ordinary things and realize
another aspect of functionality.

So it is apparent we live in a world of unrealized functionalityion
Therefore, we DO NOT talk about nature as "the" functionality, for this
is unknown, however we do talk about it within the domain of shared
functionality. 


The problem I see is that people end up moving the conversation into
an abstraction of self-referentiality.  Progress can't be made anymore,
because no one is talking about anything that means anything other
than itself.


